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ABSTRACT 
 
JOHN D. MINI: Conflict, Cooperation, and Congressional End-Runs:  The Defense Budget 
 and Civil-Military Relations in the Carter Administration, 1977-1978 
 (Under the Direction of Richard H. Kohn) 
 
President Jimmy Carter became commander-in-chief at an important juncture in American 
civil-military relations.  This study adds to the largely neglected historiography of civil-
military relations during the Carter years by examining the administration’s first two years, 
using the civil-military dialogue surrounding the fiscal year 1978 and fiscal year 1979 
defense budgets as its primary category of analysis.  The study demonstrates that growing 
cooperation within the Pentagon, increasing conflict between the Pentagon and the White 
House, and a strengthening military-congressional alliance best characterized civil-military 
relations in the first two years of the Carter administration.  This pattern of civil-military 
relations prevailed primarily due to early and intense presidential involvement in the defense 
budgetary process and because of the administration’s attempts to re-prioritize defense 
spending.  The culmination of this pattern of civil-military relations in the administration’s 
first two years was the presidential veto of the fiscal year 1979 defense appropriations bill. 
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Conflict, Cooperation, and Congressional End-Runs:  The Defense Budget and Civil-
Military Relations in the Carter Administration, 1977-1978 
 
Introduction:  Blair House, 10 December 1976, 1:00 p.m.1
President-elect Jimmy Carter sat silently, smiling and nodding as General George Brown, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed him on the state of the nation’s military and on 
national security.  This was the third president for whom General Brown had served as the 
senior ranking military advisor.  A decorated bomber pilot in World War II and Korea and a 
senior officer in the Pentagon during Vietnam, Brown had seen remarkable changes in both 
warfare and American policy during the Cold War.  He must have believed with deep 
conviction the underlying message of his briefing, which he delivered with a sense of 
urgency:  The Soviet Union’s growth in power over the previous decade presented a grave 
risk to America’s national security.  Brown indicated that he was “well aware of the intense 
pressure to reduce defense appropriations” but emphasized that he could not “stress too 
strongly that preserving the freedom and security of the United States requires well-
equipped, trained, and ready armed forces whose power must be recognized and reliable.”2
1 Blair House is a secure building across the street from the White House.  The date and time of this meeting, 
the first between President-elect Carter and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is taken from George S. Brown, "Daily 
Log, January 1, 1977 to June 30, 1977," CJCS Brown Files, Box 64, NARA II, College Park, MD. General 
account of this meeting is taken from Mark Perry, Four Stars (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 264-266.  A 
Pentagon civilian present at the meeting confirmed Perry’s anonymously sourced account in Richard A. 
Stubbing and Richard A. Mendel, The Defense Game: An Insider Explores the Astonishing Realities of 
America's Defense Establishment (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 345. 
 
2 George S. Brown, "JCS Briefing to President Elect Carter, 1976," CJCS Brown Files, 001 Transition to 
President Carter, Box 4, NARA II, College Park, MD.  For General Brown’s service background, see Willard J. 
Webb and Ronald H. Cole, The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ed. Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical 
Division (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 89-95 and 147-148. 
2Harold Brown, the incoming Secretary of Defense, remained taciturn and expressionless 
throughout the presentation.  Secretary Brown was also a veteran of the Pentagon during the 
Vietnam War, serving as the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and later 
Secretary of the Air Force.  He obtained his Ph.D. at the age of twenty-three, and those close 
to him dubbed him nothing less than an “authentic genius.”  Harold Brown was a quiet and 
introverted man; although not outwardly expressive of his opinion, he considered the Soviet 
Union as a grave threat and agreed with Brown’s views.3
Around the edges of the room sat lower-ranking members of the military who served as 
aides or members of the service staffs in the Pentagon.  Sometimes referred to in Washington 
as “iron majors,” these officers had spent much less time in service than the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS).4 They had almost certainly seen combat in Vietnam, but not in World War II 
and Korea.  Despite their more limited military experience, they would play an important role 
in implementing the new president’s defense policies.  This was the first meeting between the 
president-elect and his top military advisors who eagerly awaited Carter’s comments at the 
conclusion of the briefing. 
 Carter smiled again and thanked General Brown for the briefing.  The President indicated 
that he would study the written copy detailing the relative inferiority of the U.S. vis-à-vis the 
 
3 For Harold Brown’s background see Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, The Department of Defense, 1947-
1997, ed. Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1997), 96. For quiet demeanor and leadership style see Bernard Weinraub, "The Browning of the 
Pentagon," The New York Times Magazine, January 29, 1978.  For quote on “authentic genius” see John Kester, 
interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, 14 April 1998, OSD Oral History, 36.  For his view of the 
Soviet threat and understanding of the Joint Chiefs’ position, see Harold Brown, interview by Alfred Goldberg 
and Maurice Matloff, 8 October 1992, OSD Oral History, 1-4. 
 
4 “Iron major” is, according to Pentagon correspondent Richard Halloran, “a term of obscure Army origin.”  
“Iron majors” were often lieutenant colonels and sometimes even full colonels.  The example “iron major” cited 
in Halloran’s account was a Navy commander with sixteen years of service. In Halloran’s words these officers 
“labor in the back rooms of the Pentagon drawing up the first drafts of anything from national strategy to 
military budgets to war plans.” Often the final drafts bore strong imprints of their initial work.  See Richard 
Halloran, "Of Paper Tigers Whose Joy in Life Is Red Stripes," New York Times, October 25, 1984, B14. 
3Soviets.  Military stomachs probably churned as Carter announced that he planned to reduce 
and economize U.S. military spending while at the same time seeking “deep cuts” in both the 
Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons arsenals.  Then he asked a question, almost in an off-hand 
manner: “By the way, how long would it take to reduce the number of nuclear weapons 
currently in our arsenal?”5
General Brown hesitated, and he and Harold Brown exchanged uneasy glances.  The U.S. 
possessed thousands of nuclear weapons—carried by over one-thousand land-based 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, approximately 650 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 
and over two-hundred nuclear-capable B-52 bombers—which formed a balanced strategic 
force known as the “triad.”6 The military considered all three mutually supporting and 
necessary.  They had come on line during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations with full 
approval by Congress in order to maintain a credible national strategy of deterrence against 
the Soviets.  Most defense analysts believed that even minor reductions in one part of the 
triad might have a major impact on the overall strategic balance.7 General Brown asked for 
clarification.  What kind of reduction did the president-elect have in mind? 
 Then Carter issued his “blockbuster” reply:  “What would it take to get it down to a few 
hundred?  Let’s say 200 missiles total.”  Silence fell on the room.  One military staff member 
present that afternoon later recalled, “You could hear a pin drop.”8 Stunned by the boldness 
 
5 Perry, Four Stars, 265. 
 
6 United States. Dept. of Defense., Annual Defense Department Report (Washington,: Dept. of Defense; for sale 
by the Supt. of Docs. U.S. Gov’t. Printing Office, 1978), C-5. Hereafter cited as FY78 Annual DoD Report. 
 
7 For diversification and mutual support of the triad, see Harold Brown, Thinking About National Security: 
Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World (New York: Westview Press, 1983), 62-64.  For necessity of 
balance in the triad, see Brown, Thinking About National Security, 74. 
 
8 Perry, Four Stars, 266. 
 
4of the reduction, General Brown was speechless.  He just stood looking at Carter.  After an 
awkward moment of silence, the reply came from the heretofore quiet Harold Brown, who 
cautioned that such an immense reduction would be a “fundamental risk.”  Carter nonetheless 
indicated that he wanted studies conducted on the matter immediately.  General Brown, 
“apparently overcoming his astonishment,” replied that he would ensure that his staff 
conducted the study.9
Within hours, some of the military participants leaked reports of the meeting to 
congressmen and senators on Capitol Hill, as well as to the outgoing administration in the 
White House, where President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were 
quoted as being “appalled.”  Political pundits wrote two accounts of the incident within a 
month, fed by further leaks concerning the meeting and Carter’s reiteration of the request for 
a “200 missile” study at a subsequent meeting in January.10 Since the Joint Chiefs had not 
dissented during the meeting, incoming Secretary of State Cyrus Vance told Kissinger that he 
felt the military was in favor of the reduction of missiles and defense spending.  After leaving 
office, Kissinger contacted the Joint Chiefs and told them that they “might be in for difficult 
times.”11 It appeared that relations between the civilian leaders of the new administration 
and their military advisors were off to a tense start. 
 In many ways, this first meeting between President Carter and his senior defense advisors 
was emblematic of civil-military relations during the first two years of the Carter 
administration.  Carter had bold plans to cut defense expenditures and reduce nuclear 
 
9 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Nuclear 'Blockbuster'," Washington Post, January 27, 1977, A23. 
 
10 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Carter's 200 Missiles," Washington Post, February 12, 1977, A15. 
 
11 William Y. Smith, "Memorandum for Record, Subject: JCS Meeting 1000 19 January 1977, January 21, 
1977," CJCS Brown Files, 001 Transition to President Carter, Box 4, NARA II, College Park, MD. 
 
5weapons, and they made not only the military, but also many of his civilian advisors, 
apprehensive.  Harold Brown, quiet at first, would gradually become more assertive in 
aligning himself with the Joint Chiefs and speaking out when he felt Carter’s plans went too 
far; and the military would continue to resort to using press leaks and behind-the-scenes 
congressional lobbying, often termed the “end run,” to resist Carter’s plans.12 
While certainly this first meeting between Carter and the Joint Chiefs showed that the 
civil-military relationship began on a tense note, one should not rush to judgment as to its 
long-term impact.  To understand and evaluate fully the civil-military relationship during the 
Carter Administration requires a much deeper analysis which to date does not exist in the 
scholarship. 
The Carter Years and Civil-Military Relations:  A Gap in the Historiography 
Scholars have neglected the Carter Administration’s civil-military relations, perhaps 
because no major military conflict or civil-military “blowup” occurred in those years.  
Furthermore, even the secondary literature devoted to evaluating and chronicling Carter’s 
presidency barely mentions his relationship with his military advisors.  This omission is all 
the more surprising considering that Carter’s presidency came immediately after the official 
end of the Vietnam War, a conflict that had, in the words of military historian Allan Millett, 
“ended twenty-five years of American military superiority” and left many in the nation 
feeling “disaffected from both their political leadership and their armed forces.”13 
12 The definition of the term “end run” has varied, but in general the term referred to a maneuver in which 
impediments were bypassed, often by deceit or trickery.  The term has applied to football when the running 
back attempts to circumvent one end of the defensive line.  A less well-known usage connoted a high-speed 
maneuver by a submarine used to gain a hidden and advantageous firing position against an unsuspecting 
surface ship.  This second definition seemed particularly ironic given President Carter’s military service as a 
submarine officer and the fact that his policies became the “target” of such a maneuver by the military. 
 
13 Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of 
America, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 572 and 607. 
6Works dealing with the broader topic of American civil-military relations usually devote a 
chapter to the Carter years, but their analysis tends to be very general, attempting to compare 
and contrast administrations.  One example of such a study is Mark Perry’s Four Stars 
(1989) which examined civil-military relations from the Truman to the Reagan 
administrations.14 Perry, a journalist, conducted interviews with field-grade military officers 
to craft an interesting portrait of a very strained relationship between Carter and the JCS, but 
because of his anonymous attributions and non-specific citations his work is not in many 
respects a credible or respected source.  Relying heavily on Perry’s interpretations, Dale 
Herspring’s The Pentagon and the Presidency:  Civil Military Relations from FDR to George 
W. Bush (2005) also dedicated a chapter to the Carter years.15 Both works concluded that, in 
part due to the tenseness of the first meeting between Carter and the JCS, the civil-military 
relationship began badly and never fully recovered.  Charles Stevenson’s SECDEF:  The 
Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense (2006) took a similar approach. His 
comparative study explored the operating styles of various Secretaries, devoting a chapter to 
Harold Brown and concluding that he was an effective “team player.”16 
The only historical account focusing exclusively upon Carter’s interaction with his 
military advisors is Steven Rearden’s volume in the classified official history of the JCS.  
Based upon extensive research in classified government documents and memos, in The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and National Policy Volume XII 1977-1980 (2002), Rearden concluded that, 
although the relationship between Carter and the JCS improved somewhat over time, it never 
 
14 Mark Perry, Four Stars (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989). 
 
15 Dale R. Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency : Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. 
Bush, Modern War Studies. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005). 
 
16 Charles A. Stevenson, SECDEF:  The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: 
Potomac Books, Inc., 2006), 5. 
 
7became a relationship based on trust and cooperation.17 Rearden’s access to classified 
documents in both the Pentagon and the Carter Library proved to be one of the great 
strengths of his account, yet because of his exclusive focus on the JCS he tended to examine 
the defense policy formulation process to the exclusion of other areas such as the defense 
budget process.  The work also suffers from some of the limitations associated with official 
history.  As historian Martin Blumenson has pointed out, many scholars have been quick to 
criticize the perceived “partisan” nature of official histories and the “censorship” process 
involved in finalizing them.18 While most of these weaknesses have been overstated, the fact 
that Rearden’s official history remains accessible to only a small readership means that a new 
look at civil-military relations during the Carter years will be a significant contribution to the 
historiography. 
 A New Look at Civil-Military Relations in the Carter Years:  The Purpose and Thesis of 
This Study 
 
This study adds to the historiography of civil-military relations during the Carter years by 
examining the first two years of the administration, using the civil-military interaction during 
the fiscal year 1978 and fiscal year 1979 budget deliberations as its primary subject for 
analysis.  Broadly, the study assesses civil-military relations in the Carter Administration in 
1977 and 1978.  What was the political-military situation as Carter came into office and how 
did it affect civil-military relations?  What were the incoming administration’s goals in 
defense budgets, and how did the military and Congress perceive these goals?  Finally, what 
patterns of civil-military relations shaped the defense budget process through FY78 and 
 
17 Steven Rearden, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy Volume XII 1977-1980, ed. Office of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Joint History Office, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. XII (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Gov't Printing Office, 2002). 
 
18 Martin Blumenson, "Can Official History Be Honest History?," in Military Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 4, (Winter 
1962-1963), 153-161. 
8FY79?  Answering these questions will fill a lacuna in the current historiography of post 
World War II civil-military relations and offer further explanation and insight into a 
relationship within the government which has powerful national security implications. 
 The thesis of this study is that civil-military relations in the first two years of the Carter 
administration were best characterized by growing cooperation within the Pentagon, 
increasing conflict between the Pentagon and the White House, and a strengthening military-
congressional alliance—all the product of the administration’s attempts to change defense 
spending and the president’s early, intense involvement in the defense budgetary process.  
Carter and his staff had conducted extensive research into national defense policy prior to 
assuming office. Their desire to economize defense spending was well publicized.  Assuming 
power after intense civil-military conflict, both the military and Congress worried about the 
new president’s plans.  Immediately upon taking office, Carter embarked on an ambitious 
effort to increase civilian control, specifically presidential control, over the department of 
defense budget, but met resistance from a military-congressional alliance.  Conflict was not 
the only aspect of the civil-military relationship during this period of the Carter 
administration.  Military leaders gradually adapted to and cooperated with the civilians in the 
Pentagon, although Secretary of Defense Harold Brown never fully gained the loyalty of his 
first set of military Chiefs.  For both the military and for Congress, the main conflict came 
over early presidential involvement in the budgetary process and the administration’s attempt 
to change defense spending.  The military, cooperating with civilians in the Pentagon, sought 
to circumvent Carter’s control of the budget by increasingly lobbying Congress from FY78 
to FY79.  The military recognized that the opportunity was ripe for such lobbying due to an 
opening rift between the White House and Congress.  This Executive-Legislative conflict 
9was brought about by the unpolished nature of Carter’s staff and the President’s increasing 
attempt to usurp Congress’ role in formulating the defense budget.  The conflict culminated 
in the presidential veto of the FY79 defense appropriations bill. 
 In supporting its conclusions, this study first reviews alternative methodologies for 
studying civil-military relations and then explains why using the annual defense budget 
process as the primary category of analysis is appropriate.  Next, the study charts the 
political-military situation in 1976 and demonstrates that Carter’s assumption of the 
presidency came at an important juncture for the future of American civil-military relations.  
Having established the significance of Carter entering office, the study then examines 
Carter’s initial plans and expectations, his civilian advisors, high-ranking military leaders, 
and Congress with regard to national security and the defense budget process.  Thereafter, 
substantial analysis reveals the characteristics of civil-military relations within two 
subsequent iterations of the annual defense budget in FY78 and FY79.  Finally, this study 
establishes the relevance of using the FY79 defense budget as an ending point to evaluate 
civil-military relations in the first half of the administration, briefly reflects on how these 
budgets were different from the last two in FY80 and FY81, and concludes by demonstrating 
why civil-military relations in the Carter years deserve continued study. 
Evaluating Civil-Military Relations: Previous Approaches and This Study’s Methodology 
 Historians and political scientists have studied civil-military relations in America using a 
variety of methodologies or approaches and, as a result, their contributions to the 
historiography reveal much diversity.  Some have focused on important, specific events and 
attempted to gauge civil-military cooperation and conflict from the dialogue created during 
these crises.  An example of such a methodology, which examined the civil-military relations 
10 
surrounding the creation of the Department of Defense from the former Navy and War 
Departments, is Demetrios Caraley’s The Politics of Military Unification (1966).19 Paul 
Hammond took a similar approach in Organizing for Defense (1961), an “administrative 
history” of the military focusing on key events from 1945-1960.20 
A second approach has analyzed the civil-military dialogue created by the evolution and 
crafting of defense policy.  The best example of such a work is Eliot Cohen’s Supreme 
Command (2002), which used case studies of national leaders from Lincoln to Ben-Gurion to 
demonstrate successful civilian control over military leaders in wartime, even to the point of 
how war would be waged.21 An application of this approach to the Carter Administration is 
Sam Sarkesian’s Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter's First Years (1979).  Because 
Sarkesian authored his work midway through the administration, he was unable to draw more 
than tentative conclusions about the civil-military relationship, which he characterized as 
strained but showing promise for improvement.22 
A third approach has been to study the “politics of defense resource allocation” by 
examining the civil-military interaction involved in crafting annual defense budgets.  One 
study that focused upon the defense budget as the primary category of analysis for civil-
military relations is Edward Kolodziej’s The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963 
 
19 Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1966). 
 
20 Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). 
 
21 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Free Press, 
2002). 
 
22 Sam Charles Sarkesian, Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter's First Years, Westview Special Studies 
in National Security and Defense Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979). 
 
11 
(1966).23 Similarly, political scientist Alex Mintz focused exclusively on the budget in his 
study of civil-military interaction in The Politics of Resource Allocation in the U.S. 
Department of Defense (1988).24 
A final approach to the study of civil-military relations has focused primarily upon the 
interaction between Congress and the military since World War II.  Samuel Huntington’s The 
Common Defense (1961) is probably the most significant work of this type.25 Steven 
Scroggs’ Army Relations with Congress (2000) provides a more recent example.  Scroggs 
examined and compared the “congressional liaison offices” of each armed service and how 
each has become increasingly assertive in engaging Congress to gain support for desired 
programs and for a larger share of the defense budget.26 Overall, however, as historian A. J. 
Bacevich has pointed out, the field of military history has been slow to identify and evaluate 
this “politicization” of the military.27 
One reason for the variety of methodologies used to study civil-military relations may be 
the difficulty in defining precisely what the term “civil-military relations” means. Samuel 
Huntington, in his landmark The Soldier and the State (1957), crafted the first broad 
definition of civil-military relations, perceiving it as a “system composed of interdependent 
elements.” Three primary components comprised this system:  (1) “the formal, structural 
 
23 Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963 (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 1966). 
 
24 Alex Mintz, The Politics of Resource Allocation in the U.S. Department of Defense: International Crises and 
Domestic Constraints (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). 
 
25 Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961). 
 
26 Stephen K. Scroggs, Army Relations with Congress: Thick Armor, Dull Sword, Slow Horse (Westport, Conn.: 
Praeger, 2000). 
 
27 Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Paradox of Professionalism:  Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian 
Control, 1953-1955," The Journal of Military History Vol. 61 No. 2, April 1997, 305. 
 
12 
position of military institutions in the government;” (2) “the informal role and influence of 
military groups in politics and society at large;” and (3) “the nature of the ideologies of 
military and non-military groups.”28 Douglas Kinnard truncated Huntington’s definition, 
describing it as “the relationship between the military and society” and “the politics of 
defense policy and resource allocation.”29 Richard Kohn has often focused on civil-military 
relations “at the pinnacle of the government,” pointing out “the ménage a trois between the 
administration, Congress, and the military.”30 Most recently, political scientist Peter Feaver 
has examined civil-military relations in terms of an “agency theory” where “the essence of 
civil-military relations is strategic interaction between civilian principals and military 
agents.”31 The diversity of these definitions, all certainly accurate but with different points of 
emphasis, attest to the need for the historian to define the term as it applies to his work. 
 For the purpose of this study, civil-military relations are defined as the discursive 
relationships between the president, his high-level military and civilian advisors, and the 
Congress.  High-level advisors in this case include the president’s own staff and cabinet as 
well as the JCS and service staffs of the Pentagon.  The relationship is primarily discursive 
because it is built upon communication—although the president constitutionally assumes 
duty as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, all chief executives have to some degree 
taken the advice of their uniformed military advisors as to how to play this role, and this 
 
28 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), viii. 
 
29 Douglass Kinnard, "The New Civil Military Relations," in The U.S. Constitution and the Military, ed. Charles 
A. Bodie and Blair P. Turner (Virginia Military Institute: Department of History and Politics, 1986), 65. 
 
30 Richard H. Kohn, "The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today," Naval War 
College Review LV(3), Summer 2002, 9 and 17. 
 
31 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 2-3. 
 
13 
advisory relationship is codified in law.  While the military remains constitutionally and 
legally subordinate to the president and his Secretary of Defense, high ranking officers have 
always resisted some aspects of civilian control.32 
Congress has always played a major role in the civil-military relationship and has always 
attempted to a greater or lesser degree to influence an administration’s national defense 
policy.  Members of the House and Senate Armed Services, Budget, and Appropriations 
Committees have particular power in the politics of defense policy and resource allocation.33 
The members of these committees have tended to be more conservative than the Congress as 
a whole, but like the rest have been subject to the pressures of their own parties and voters.34 
High ranking members of the military services frequently testify before various House and 
Senate committees, and Congress expects these officers to present their personal views fully 
and honestly when questioned on the issue, even if they disagree with an executive policy. 35 
There has always been some degree of doubt as to whether their testimony is full and frank, 
since military careers may be at risk if public statements prove damaging to official policy.36 
32 Harold Brown discussed this at length in his oral history interviews, noting that military resistance was 
particularly strong when civilians attempted to become involved in contingency planning and general officer 
promotions.  See Harold Brown, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, 4 December 1981, OSD Oral 
History, 20 and Harold Brown, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, 28 February 1992, OSD 
Oral History, 16 and 19-20.  Note that this study most closely follows the definition of civil-military relations 
proposed by Richard H. Kohn because its focus is on the highest levels of government and also includes the role 
of Congress. 
 
33 Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 26. 
 
34 Huntington, The Common Defense, 390.  For military confirmation of this perspective see David Jones, 
interview by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, 26 August 1987, OSD Oral History, 42-43.  
 
35 For this precedent, see the testimony of Harold Brown in United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on 
Armed Services., Nominations of Harold Brown and Charles W. Duncan, Jr. : Hearing before the Committee 
on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, on Nominations of Harold 
Brown, to Be Secretary of Defense, Charles W. Duncan, Jr., to Be Deputy Secretary of Defense, January 11, 
1977 (Washington: U.S. Gov’t. Printing Office, 1977), 18. Hereafter cited as Brown Nomination Hearings. 
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United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 236. 
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Intrigued by this paradox, the press has often taken particular interest in the interaction 
between the military, the president, and Congress, all of whom in turn have utilized the press 
as means to influence public opinion. 
 The military’s relationship with Congress has become increasingly significant to civil-
military relations since the end of World War II.  One of the central arguments of Huntington 
in The Common Defense was that, since 1945, the military has sought influence within 
Congress in order to “develop the mechanisms and support necessary for survival in the 
pluralistic world of American politics.”37 Each service’s Congressional Legislative Liaison 
(CLL) office in the Pentagon, formed after the 1947 Defense Reorganization Act, 
exemplified such support mechanisms.  Each CLL has employed military officers with 
special knowledge of important service programs to brief members of Congress and their 
staffs.  Although officially each CLL conducts “liaison,” not lobbying (which is illegal for 
executive branch organizations), they have increasingly provided a conduit for direct military 
communication to lawmakers.38 The public relations division of the Pentagon has provided 
another support mechanism for post-WWII military dealings with Congress.  Dedicated 
public relations efforts have helped the military pressure Congress by using the press to draw 
public attention to controversial defense issues.39 Increasingly, congressmen have visited the 
 
37 For an account of congressional involvement in defense policy see Huntington, The Common Defense, 384-
389.  Huntington described the military involvement with Congress as a process of “castellation” where the 
military constructed figurative castle-like fortifications to protect its interests and become “well entrenched on 
the political scene, as countless other interest groups, private and public, had done before them.” 
 
38 For selection of officers and close contact with Congressmen and Senators, see Scroggs, Army Relations with 
Congress, 7.  For history and evolution of CLL see Scroggs, Army Relations with Congress, 17 and Adam 
Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society, 1st ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 
1971), 42.  Yarmolinsky called the CLL the “most visible lobbying arm” of the military. 
 
39 Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, 1st ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 201.  For significance of 
the public relations departments since World War II see Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment, 197 and 
Smith, American Democracy and Military Power, 240-241. 
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military in the field, where one military legislative liaison officer stated that “our lobbying 
effectiveness is at its height” since in the field the congressmen can “see for themselves” and 
talk directly to soldiers.40 Military-affiliated special interest groups, such as the Navy 
League, Association of the U.S. Army, and the Air Force Sergeants Association have also 
bolstered the influence of the military with Congress in the twentieth century.41 Finally, the 
increasing power of the military-industrial complex has allowed the Pentagon to adopt a 
“carrot and stick” approach with Congress, awarding the most lucrative contracts to districts 
represented by legislators who consistently voted “pro-defense.”42 Thus, political scientist 
Dale Herspring’s conclusion that “the military is now a bureaucratic interest group much like 
others in Washington”43 seems very accurate.  Any full appraisal of post-World War II civil-
military relations must therefore take the role of Congress into account. 
 In examining the interactions among the president, his military and civilian advisors, and 
the Congress, this study will utilize the annual defense budgetary process as its category of 
analysis because this process involves sustained, day-to-day contact among civilian and 
military personnel in the government and also draws the full involvement of Congress.  As 
 
40 Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, 203. 
 
41 See Jack Anderson, "The Lobbying for the B-1 Bomber," Washington Post, April 3, 1977, C7.  Anderson 
stated that, “In the top executive suites of almost all the top defense contractors are retired generals and 
admirals who are on first-name basis with the Pentagon’s big brass.”  For an example of the printed lobby 
material from one of these groups see "Air Force Sergeant's Association Lobby Ledger Vol. II No. 11, 
November 2, 1976," Jimmy Carter Presidential Papers--Pre-Presidential, Office of Public Liaison, Costanza, 
Box 36, Folder: Air Force Sergeant's Association 7/76-4/77 [OA 4413], Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.  
See also Huntington, The Common Defense, 396-397.  Huntington described these military-affiliated lobbying 
groups as sometimes “more royalist than the king” in support for military spending. 
 
42 For examples of the power of the military industrial-complex with Congress and in the Pentagon see George 
Wilson, "Aircraft Engine Sparks Fierce Lobbying," Washington Post, March 12, 1979, A1 and A4, and Kenneth 
Bacon, "Pentagon Studies Anatomy of 'Top Secret' Data Leak," Washington Post, March 3, 1979, A6.  For 
“carrot and stick” see Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment, 41. 
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16 
one retired general who worked in the Pentagon expressed, “attention to the budget never 
ceases throughout the year.”44 This distinguishes the defense budgetary process from other 
categories of analysis which are often used to examine civil-military relations such as 
“official defense policies” and “key events.”  For instance, official written defense policies 
are only periodically reviewed and, according to former Chairman of the JCS General David 
Jones, fulfilling all aspects of written defense policies “would require tens of billions of 
dollars more than was within the budget even in the best years.”45 This is perhaps why long-
time Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) historian Alfred Goldberg commented that the 
defense budget “may be a better guide to strategy than the defense [policy] guidance.”46 
Likewise, the focus on only “key events” surrounding civil-military relations has significant 
drawbacks compared to the defense budget process in evaluating these relations because the 
sum of “key events” does not necessarily add up to the whole “day-to-day” process of civil-
military relations within a given administration.  Thus, the primary category of analysis for 
this research project will be the annual defense budget process.47 The study will examine the 
Carter administration’s first two defense budgets, fiscal year 1978 and 1979, and will begin 
by explaining why Jimmy Carter’s ascendancy to the presidency came at an important time 
for the future of American civil-military relations. 
 
44 Frederick Kroesen, interview by Jerry Frost, 1987, Vol. II, Carlisle Oral History Collection, Project 87-14, 
Box 1, 367.  For other scholarly support for the importance of the budget, see Huntington, The Common 
Defense, 223.  Huntington points out that the budget is “a principal means of civilian control over the military” 
and therefore critical to understanding civil-military relations as a whole. 
 
45 David Jones, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, 21 October 1987, OSD Oral History, 9.   
 
46 Ibid.  Goldberg has been the Chief OSD Historian since 1973. 
 
47 See Appendix 1 for a discussion and typical timeline of the annual defense budget process. 
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A Time of Dynamic Uncertainty:  The Military-Political Situation as Carter Took Office 
President Carter recognized that he was taking office at a time of political turmoil, when 
the scars from Vietnam and Watergate had not yet healed.  He felt strongly that “Americans 
desired a return to the first principles of their government.”  He hoped to bind the nation 
together by basing the role of America in the world on “a sense of remembered history” that 
focused on his “most important values—human rights, environmental quality, nuclear arms 
control, and the search for justice and peace.” 48 He viewed nuclear weapons as evil and a 
great threat to global security; consequently, in his inaugural address, he proposed 
eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.49 Carter recognized the need to heal 
in some way the division of the country over Vietnam; therefore, one day after taking office, 
he issued a presidential pardon for all those with outstanding warrants for draft evasion 
during the war.50 
Clearly, Jimmy Carter viewed his term beginning in 1977 as a pivotal point in the nation’s 
history.  For several additional reasons the eve of Carter’s inaugural proved to be an 
important point for the future of the military.  Analysis of five different areas indicates that 
this time stood out as a dynamic period of uncertainty for the future course of post-Vietnam 
civil-military relations. 
 First, according to mounting Cold War rhetoric from defense officials and military 
officers, the capability of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviets had declined significantly.  
Outgoing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld lamented in his annual defense guidance 
 
48 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 21-22. 
 
49 United States. President. (1977-1981: Carter), Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter (Washington: 
U.S. Gov’t. Printing Office, 1977), 3. 
 
50 United States. President. (1977-1981: Carter), Presidential Proclamation of Pardon, Proclamation 4483 
January 21, 1977 (Washington: U.S. Gov’t. Printing Office, 1977), 5. 
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that reductions in defense spending in the 1970s, combined with the enormous cost of 
sustaining the war in Vietnam, had severely “retarded the rate of modernization and 
expansion of U.S. forces.”51 At the same time, as General Brown emphasized in his briefing 
to President Carter, the Soviet Union had more than doubled its defense outlays relative to 
the U.S.52 Regardless of how one viewed the Soviet intentions, their capabilities appeared 
formidable—almost all of their modernization had gone into forces which constituted, in the 
words of defense analysts, a “direct threat to the United States and its European allies.”53 
Some argued that the fictional “missile gap” of the 1960’s had become a reality.  Since 1965 
the U.S. had developed one new intercontinental nuclear missile; in that same period, the 
U.S.S.R. had developed seven, and three of their newest missiles demonstrated more 
accuracy and power than even the best American model.54 Defense experts considered the 
Russian front-line tank in Europe superior to any tank in NATO.  Additionally, the Soviet 
Navy had embarked on a massive shipbuilding program and had just launched its first aircraft 
carrier, creating a “maritime problem” that constituted a “substantial and growing challenge 
to the U.S. and its free access to the seas.”55 Intelligence reports circulating in the DoD 
indicated that Soviet ballistic missile submarines had “started patrolling as close as three-
hundred miles” off the American coast and that the Soviet Navy was capable of developing a 
 
51 FY78 Annual DoD Report, 2. 
 
52 Lawrence J. Korb, The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon: American Defense Policies in the 1970's,
Contributions in Political Science, No. 27. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), 147-149. 
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54 FY78 Annual DoD Report, 10.  Historian Richard Thornton indicated that such intelligence reports gravely 
alarmed National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who felt that the Soviets now had the capability to 
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“depressed trajectory” submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which would provide 
“almost nothing” in the way of warning against a pre-emptive strike.56 Published just before 
Carter took office, the conclusion of the FY78 Defense Guidance emphasized that, “to a 
degree unprecedented in history, the United States has become directly vulnerable to 
attack.”57 When President Ford proposed a record setting $130 billion for defense in FY78, 
one Pentagon official explained: “The Russian’s aren’t coming—they’re here.”58 While 
many would dispute the validity of the Cold War rhetoric, the fact remained that it had 
reached a near crescendo by the time Jimmy Carter assumed office. 
 Second, the military faced a potential personnel crisis as it entered the second half of the 
1970s.  After the abolition of the draft and the transition to the All-Volunteer Force, the 
military initially appeared to have stabilized its recruiting patterns.  However, the 1974 
recruiting year saw a significant drop in volunteers and by 1975 most services, the Army 
especially, found themselves with significant personnel shortages.  According to one Army 
official history, when faced with such challenges associated with the All-Volunteer Force, 
many high-ranking officers “began to question the efficacy of the concept once again.”59 
The Army and the rest of the military were not alone in recognizing the problem: one 
independent study projected that by FY80 the military would need to recruit one out of every 
 
56 Ray B. Sitton, interview by Marcus J. Boyle, transcript, K239.0512-1570, USAF Oral History Collection, 
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three eligible service-age males to meet “total force requirements.”60 The Air Force, in what 
was termed its period of “retrenchment,” also faced manpower shortages.61 As a result of 
this personnel crisis, one suggested remedy was the fuller integration of women into the 
military.  The U.S. military already by 1976 had 130,000 women in service, the largest 
component of any military force in the world; yet, the roles that these female soldiers would 
fill were still under debate, leading to much uncertainty within all of the services as to how 
they might have to adapt.62 Indeed, Congressional hearings concluded that in 1977 the 
military was “at something of a crossroads in regards to the cost of defense manpower.”63 
Third, this time period saw the military in significant fiscal turmoil.  Unprecedented 
inflation rates undermined the overall stability of the economy and threatened to wipe out the 
increase to the defense budget proposed by President Ford.64 The long-term impact of the 
1973 and 1977 OPEC oil embargoes had been to increase the price of fuel to the point that it 
was prohibitive for many services to conduct training exercises.65 Beyond the impact of 
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inflation and fuel shortages, the military increasingly struggled to fund research, 
development, and procurement for new weapons systems because of rises in personnel 
operating costs.  One major increase in costs came from pay for retired veterans, over one 
million of whom drew government pensions in 1974, a one-hundred and fifty percent 
increase from a decade earlier.66 In FY1964 overall personnel costs accounted for only 
28.7% of the defense budget, but by FY1976 rose to 36.5%, with projections close to fifty-
seven percent for FY1978.67 These “off the top” costs within the military budget drastically 
reduced money available for developing future weapons systems and for the procurement of 
more modern ones.68 Longtime Department of Defense (DoD) official William Perry, then 
chief of research and development at the Pentagon, said that his “single most serious 
problem” was that by 1977 the U.S. defense technology budget had decreased by a factor of 
two since 1964.69 This financial crisis meant that many within the military saw the new 
weapons programs proposed at the end of the Ford Administration as particularly critical. 
 The fact that Carter’s first year saw the emergence of these new weapon systems was the 
fourth significant factor bearing on the future of civil-military relations as he took office.  
Many high ranking military officers saw the procurement of these weapons as essential to 
balancing and eventually surpassing the Soviet Union’s military capability.  Today these 
systems are the base of our fighting forces, but in 1976 many were hanging by a thin fiscal 
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thread.  The Army’s XM-1 tank, Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, the Apache helicopter, 
and long-range Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) were all in the nascent stages of 
development.  After ten years in development, the Air Force’s crown jewel, the B-1 bomber, 
was about to enter limited production as the costliest aircraft in history.  The Navy was just 
starting to field its advanced “Aegis” air defense system and was fighting for funds to 
commission a fifth 97,000-ton nuclear-powered supercarrier.  The Marines were on the verge 
of replacing their obsolescent A-4 attack aircraft with new “Harrier” and F-18 jet fighters.  
All of these advancements would require continued funding in the defense budget and 
approval from the new president. 
 Finally, the political climate in regard to national defense was undergoing significant 
transition during the mid-1970s.  In one aspect this seemed to bode well for the military, 
since some polls were indicating that public opinion had shifted in favor of higher defense 
spending.  One such poll indicated that, while in 1972 only forty-nine percent of Americans 
felt that military defense spending should be increased or maintained, by 1976 seventy-one 
percent of Americans felt that way.  Similarly, in the same period, those calling for reduced 
military spending fell from thirty seven percent to twenty percent.70 Echoing public 
sentiment, the U.S. Conference of Mayors in late 1975 refused to endorse a resolution calling 
for a shift from defense to domestic spending, despite the fact that their cities were hard 
pressed for funds.71 One senior Pentagon correspondent expressed his view of the situation 
by stating that Jimmy Carter would “take office enjoying an unusually wide agreement 
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among hawks and doves that the Soviet military buildup is real and that the U.S. dare not cut 
its defense spending.”72 
Despite the trend of increasing public support for defense spending, the political 
composition of several key committees in Congress, many of which would directly impact 
the military, had changed significantly in 1976.  Congressman Edward Herbert (D-LA), the 
long-time “dictatorial” chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who had always 
insisted “the Pentagon knew best,” retired at the end of 1976.  The Pentagon’s main 
challengers on the committee—Lucien Nedzi (D-MI), Charles Wilson (D-CA), Robert 
Leggett (D-CA), Les Aspin (D-WI), Patricia Schroeder (D-CO), Bob Carr (D-NY), and 
Thomas Downey (D-NY)—all won re-election.  In both the House and Senate, the budget 
committees had increasingly challenged the Armed Services with success.  In the Senate, 
Edmund Muskie (D-ME) enlisted the support of fellow members of his Budget Committee to 
overrule Armed Services Chairman John Stennis (D-MS) by refusing to fund an expensive 
nuclear-powered cruiser for the Navy.  Washington Post Pentagon correspondent George 
Wilson concluded that these changes would “promise a series of thoughtful and sometimes 
stiff challenges to Pentagon weapons and policies.”73 
Taking the Helm:  The Evolution of Carter’s Defense Plans, the “Browning of the 
Pentagon,” and the Initial Reactions 
Amid this uncertainty, the Carter administration entered office with an ambitious plan to 
increase civilian control over the military, especially over the defense budget.74 Carter 
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himself wanted to pursue this course of action based partly on his own personality and partly 
on, in his own words, “serious reservations about what happened during the Vietnam War.”75 
As a Naval Academy graduate and former submarine officer, Carter felt that he had unique 
qualifications to manage, institute budgetary control, and employ systems analysis in the 
Department of Defense.  His engineer-style approach was to “make a list, compare, establish 
priorities, and cost-out things” and, regarding his personal involvement in the defense 
budget, stated, “I thoroughly enjoyed that role.”76 His hero was Harry Truman, and Carter 
greatly admired the former president’s “strength in the face of the inevitable popularity of 
demonstrating the power of civilian control over the military” and admitted that he had 
“privately cheered” Truman’s decision to relieve General Douglas MacArthur for opposing 
civilian policy during the Korean War.77 When asked directly if Carter entered office with 
suspicions about the military, General David Jones, who served on the JCS for all four years 
of the Carter administration, did not feel that this was the case.  What was clear to General 
Jones, however, was that Carter strongly believed that the military’s “priorities got mixed up 
during the Vietnam War.”78 
further indications of the ambitiousness of the plans, see the opinion of the veteran chairman in United States. 
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 Part of this perception about the military “losing its way” may have been linked to the 
president’s personal beliefs regarding the nature of the U.S.-Soviet conflict.  Whereas the 
military and most previous administrations had focused upon the Soviet Union as the primary 
threat to American national security, Carter did not necessarily agree.  When later reflecting 
on his tenure, he unhesitatingly stated that unrest in Panama posed the “most serious and 
immediate threat” to U.S. national security.79 He, along with his closest foreign policy 
advisor Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, did not think of the U.S.-Soviet standoff in terms of 
a “Cold War.”80 His desire to seek immediate and far reaching cuts in nuclear arms with the 
Soviet Union was indicative of his belief that the two sides would continue détente and work 
together.  He firmly believed that the time was ripe for nuclear disarmament and that he 
should aggressively revitalize the stagnating Vladivostok agreement with the U.S.S.R. 
reached during Ford’s tenure.81 This was seen by some as a “political gamble” which 
challenged “grim predictions about Soviet military superiority.”82 President Carter came into 
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office seeking peace and, when reflecting on his military service, assured listeners on 
television that he felt “no aspect of militaristic inclination now on my part.”83 Jimmy Carter 
felt strongly about these ideals and sought to put them into practice when he assumed the 
presidency. 
 Although Carter may have dismissed of his “militaristic inclination” and prided himself on 
his peanut farming, he was not a defense policy neophyte.  He had in fact honed his 
understanding of national security and the defense budget for some time before taking office.  
During his campaign, he and his staff had conducted extensive national defense research.  
Despite the presence of some public opinion polls supporting a rise in defense spending, 
Carter was presented with other authoritative evidence that indicated that the time was right 
to go on the offensive against excessive military largesse.  In a memo which Carter 
recommended all members of his staff read, Harvard Professor William Schneider presented 
substantial data that the “public opinion trend since the early 1960s” had brought about “the 
destruction of the traditional pro-military consensus in the American electorate” and that 
“with so little consensus on military issues” it would be difficult to find any “valence 
sentiment likely to sweep the electorate in 1976.”84 Soon afterward, Carter’s staff requested 
background papers from the Center for Defense Information (CDI), an organization often 
skeptical regarding Pentagon claims and analysis, regarding the 1976 Defense Budget, 
defense manpower studies, the Trident SLBM program, and the B-1 bomber, as well as other 
defense related material.  The staff began to compile such information into a series of 
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“discussion papers” which were sent to Carter to expand his knowledge of national defense 
policy issues.85 
Beyond the role of his staff in the process, Carter also took a strong personal interest 
defense policy.  He corresponded with his Navy mentor and nuclear-propulsion pioneer 
Admiral Hyman Rickover regarding advantages and disadvantages of nuclear powered 
aircraft carriers.86 He maintained close correspondence with Air Force Colonel Jim Donovan 
at CDI.  Donovan authored no fewer than six briefing papers for Carter, always providing 
background information and evidence to refute or soften the strong Cold War rhetoric of the 
Defense Department.  Donovan’s conclusions were sharp; according to CDI research, claims 
of a decline in U.S. military strength vis-à-vis the Soviets had “no basis in fact.”87 This 
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personal research into different areas of defense policy and strategy provided the future 
president with much background information and many facts that he would later use to argue 
against further American military buildup. 
 Carter did not ignore the factors bearing on the future of the defense budget as he had 
conducted his campaign; on the contrary, he and his staff calculated carefully every public 
comment that they made about national defense.  Convinced that in 1976 both Congress and 
the American public were “being subjected to the most extensive fear campaign since the 
1960 ‘missile gap,’” Carter remained on guard that “a crisis of confidence in United States 
military power” could be created.88 Veteran diplomat Richard Holbrooke advised Carter 
that, even if they were not conducting the perceived military buildup, the Soviets were very 
much interested in who would win the 1976 election and could take steps to either promote 
or hinder Carter.89 Meanwhile, Carter sent his aide Stuart Eisenstat to visit the prestigious 
Brookings Institution to seek out advice on American national security policy and defense 
spending.  The institution’s report concluded that “the defense budget could be cut without 
impairing our defense posture” and that many military troop deployments and warfighting 
plans were “anachronistic” and needed to be re-examined.  By increasing efficiency in the 
Pentagon and changing procurement policy to “stop buying the most expensive weapon 
systems,” the analysts at Brookings felt that Carter could safely call for cuts in defense 
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spending.90 After President Ford released his FY77 budget, a staff consultant pointed out to 
Carter’s campaign headquarters where up to $8.5 billion could be “safely cut without 
endangering national security.”  The recommended cuts included the Air Force B-1 bomber, 
the MX missile program, the Trident SLBM, the Army’s Apache attack helicopter, the 
Navy’s proposed nuclear carrier, and reductions in retirement benefits for DoD personnel.91 
Carter had done his research and was prepared to institute major change in defense policy. 
 Carter’s views and plans regarding the military and national security were not hidden.  He 
made bold and specific defense-related campaign promises.  He repeatedly vowed to cut the 
defense budget by five to seven billion dollars, commented often about “Pentagon wastage,” 
and stated that he wanted personally to assert control of, and “discipline” over, the Pentagon 
and its budgetary process. 92 He sought to gain more control over military officer promotions 
and assignments.  In particular, he saw military retirement pay, taking up to seven percent of 
the annual defense budget, as an egregious waste of taxpayer money given the fact that many 
pension holders pursued a second career in civilian government positions.93 He promised to 
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institute rigorous “zero based budgeting” (ZBB) throughout the federal government, but 
especially in the Department of Defense, immediately after taking office.94 Additionally, he 
criticized several costly new weapons systems, especially the B-1 bomber as “an example of 
a proposed system which should not be funded and would be wasteful of taxpayer dollars.”95 
Beyond targeting specific programs such as the B-1 for possible termination, Carter indicated 
to the military through his transition team that he planned to employ the “controlled 
adversary process” which called for each service to compete against the others for resources 
and publicly critique the others requests during the annual defense budget process.96 Clearly, 
President Carter’s plans for the Pentagon were ambitious, far reaching, and well known to the 
military as he began his term. 
 Carter’s choice of Harold Brown, a former “whiz kid” member of the McNamara defense 
department, as his Secretary of Defense demonstrated a desire to increase discipline in the 
Pentagon and apply systems analysis to problems.  In choosing Brown, Carter felt he had “a 
scientist with a thorough knowledge of the most advanced technology” as well as “a 
competent business manager, strong willed enough to prevail in the internecine struggles 
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among different military services.”97 Brown had previously served as head of Pentagon 
Research, Development, and Engineering under McNamara and had shown a willingness to 
oppose major weapon systems such as the Skybolt missile and the B-70 bomber.  Like 
Carter, he was a “strong believer in reliance on the analytical capabilities of systems 
analysis.”98 This school of “systems analysis” carried a highly negative connotation for the 
military.  Many military officers considered McNamara’s reliance on systems analysis—to 
the exclusion of military experience and judgment—as responsible for the failed military 
strategy in Vietnam.99 High-ranking military officers saw Harold Brown and McNamara as 
similar and worried as Brown took over the Pentagon’s highest post. 
 The military was apprehensive about the administration’s plans for defense for several 
additional reasons.100 One major reason was that the JCS and other high-ranking members of 
the military were wary of Carter’s plans for extensive arms-control negotiations with the 
Soviets.  Most felt that the previous SALT I agreement under Nixon and the Vladivostok 
accords under Ford locked the United States into a “permanent position of inferiority” in the 
overall strategic balance.  In addition, there was a widespread belief among the military, 
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substantiated by some intelligence reports, that the Soviets cheating on the agreements.101 
For these reasons, General Brown’s initial briefing to Carter on SALT stated that “the 
unfavorable trend between U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces is of grave concern and 
will continue to worsen until the early 1980s, when U.S. Trident, B-1, and MX programs will 
affect the trends.”102 Brown, a gregarious, articulate, and politically well-connected officer, 
had been assigned the heavy responsibility under Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger of 
steering the procurement of these new strategic programs through Congress.103 As 
Chairman, Brown had more joint service in the Pentagon than any general officer in the 
military at the time, and the JCS had high hopes that he would have strong positive influence 
on Congress and help reverse what was seen as a steady weakening of U.S. strategic 
power.104 
General Brown’s status at the outset of Carter’s term, however, proved to be another 
source of apprehension for the military.  On October 10, 1974, while addressing students at 
the Duke University Law School, Brown made anti-Semitic comments to the effect that Jews 
“own all of the banks in the country” as well as all of the newspapers, that Israel had 
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“Congress in their hip pocket,” and implied that a potential solution to the problem might be 
a military coup of the federal government.105 The event sparked an immediate political 
firestorm.  Joseph Califano, Jr., a prominent Washington lawyer who would later serve as 
Carter’s Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, wrote an editorial in the Washington 
Post calling for Brown’s resignation because he had “irreparably damaged his ability to serve 
effectively as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”106 Brown apologized publicly and 
President Ford, despite considerable political pressure, refused to dismiss him.   Yet the 
damage was done.  The media lampooned Brown, with one editorial cartoon portraying him 
sitting at his desk in uniform writing a speech consisting of “ethnic remarks” with his head as 
a balloon tethered to his tie.107 Throughout his tenure the media continued to pay close 
attention to Brown’s public and private comments, leading to further calls for his resignation 
as late as April of 1977.108 Given these misstatements and his political vulnerability, many 
high-ranking military officers saw General Brown as weakened and unable to risk strongly 
opposing any plans of the civilian leadership.109 
Beyond the fear that the highest-ranking officer in the military would be unable to fulfill 
his advisory role effectively, many high-ranking officers also worried about Carter’s 
intentions to manage the defense budget.  The very areas in which Carter proposed to make 
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changes—retirement pay, officer promotions, and personnel assignments—were the areas 
where the military had in the past most actively resisted civilian “interference.”110 Carter’s 
proposed “controlled adversary process” approach to the annual defense budget also went 
directly against the traditional “logrolling” approach employed by the JCS, which, according 
to General Ray Sitton, Director of the Joint Staff, always generated decisions that were “a 
compromise position.”111 Carter’s “adversarial approach” was so unusual that it alarmed 
several high-ranking officers, one of whom wrote simply on a memorandum discussing the 
plan, “God help the U.S. and the DoD if we revert to type and do what this suggests—I am 
working with CSAF [Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General David Jones] to see if we can 
stop it from happening.”112 Military apprehension of Carter’s plans for managing the DoD 
were great, but were not yet widely known. 
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 Many of Carter’s top civilian appointees recognized these military concerns.  Harold 
Brown expected some difficulties upon entering office.  He knew that many of the current 
military leaders in the Pentagon had been more junior officers during his tenure with 
McNamara and might question his leadership.  He also knew of the influence that retired 
military officers could have on their active-duty brethren, admitting that “in the fading 
memories of some of the retired chiefs I am remembered as one of the ‘whiz kids.’”113 
Acutely aware of the perception that he was “introverted and likely to come across as cold,” 
Brown intended to make a conscious effort to mitigate, but never fully overcome, this 
“problem.”114 Robert Komer, Undersecretary for Plans and Policy, summarized Brown’s 
efforts well:  “Harold was a veteran of the McNamara years,” but at the same time, he had 
“obviously studied carefully what McNamara did right and wrong, and had consciously tried 
to handle himself differently than Bob McNamara.”115 Secretary Brown was committed to 
making the civil-military relationship in the Carter Administration as free of conflict as 
possible. 
 Trends and perceptions within Congress at the start of Carter’s term also affected civil-
military relations within the administration.  First, Carter had specifically campaigned as an 
“outsider,” thus negating some of his advantage in the Democratically-controlled Congress.  
He vowed to avoid “Washington habits which had made it possible for the American people 
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to be misled” and, in emphasizing this, placed even members of his own party in a defensive 
position from the start.116 General Alexander Haig, the politically ambitious NATO 
commander at the time, felt that the president “made it inevitable that the Washington 
establishment would treat him as an antibody to be driven out of the system.”117 Second, 
despite the changeover of key personnel in the committees relevant to the military, pundits 
noted that recently published polls supporting increased defense spending had influenced 
Congress to be wary of supporting Carter’s call for reductions in the defense budget.118 Even 
the Brookings Institution, having advised Carter in early 1975 of waste in the Pentagon 
budget, had taken note of these trends and declared that the FY77 defense budget should 
increase.119 Thus, as Carter prepared his first defense budget, Congress also had reason to be 
less than supportive of his plans to economize on defense spending. 
 Congress demonstrated its apprehension about Carter’s plans for defense during Harold 
Brown’s nomination and later during his appearance before Congress when submitting the 
unmodified Ford/Rumsfeld FY78 defense budget.  Brown expected a difficult confirmation, 
keeping a note in front of him reading: “Keep Cool. Say Less. Stop.”120 Brown did indeed 
keep his cool, holding up under five hours of “microscopic examination,” while addressing 
the Senators as a respectful younger man rather than taking the brash, sometimes 
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overwhelming approach of Robert McNamara.  He downplayed Carter’s proposed $5-7 
billion reduction in the defense budget, saying it should be seen as “savings rather than cuts.”  
In the end, the Senate unanimously confirmed him, although Senator Strom Thurmond (R-
SC) accused Brown of “withholding his views” on all major weapon systems planned for 
procurement.121 
Soon after the confirmation hearings, Secretary Brown appeared before Congress with 
General George Brown to submit the unmodified Ford/Rumsfeld Defense budget, as was 
customary for the incoming Secretary of Defense.  Some members of Congress made clear 
their reservations about the new administration’s plans.  Senator John Tower (R-TX) told 
Brown that some of the administration’s policies appeared “a little long on eagerness and a 
little short on caution.”122 While such a statement might be expected from an opposition 
party member, Senator Sam Nunn’s (D-GA) request to General Brown that the Joint Chiefs 
report directly to the Armed Services Committee because “in the past the President of the 
United States and the Secretary of State have ignored the advice of the Joint Chiefs,” was 
much more unusual.  Although General Brown seemed surprised by the request, he agreed 
that “we are certainly willing to do that.”123 The hearings ended with Secretary Brown 
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proposing to modify and resubmit the FY78 defense budget by the end of February—only a 
three-week deadline for such a major undertaking.124 
The Test Case:  The Modification of the FY78 Defense Budget and Procurement Policy 
 The process of modifying the FY 1978 budget provided the first opportunity for the Carter 
Administration to implement its plans for increased civilian control over the defense 
budgetary process.  In doing so, Carter and Brown immediately confronted a quandary.  
Carter had made his campaign promise of five to seven billion dollars in defense cuts before 
Ford and Rumsfeld had finalized their defense budget for FY78.  Just before submission, 
Ford cut his budget from $130 billion to a “lean” $123 billion, an amount widely considered 
to be a “bare bones” defense budget.  Carter faced the unsavory choice of having to break his 
campaign promise or break the NATO alliance’s agreement that all members’ defense 
expenditures would have an above-inflation (real) increase of three percent per year.  
Additionally, based on the structure of the Ford/Rumsfeld budget, any major cuts that Carter 
made would either result in a fundamental policy change or a challenge to “powerful vested 
interests,” such as base closings or personnel reductions.125 
Carter did not shrink from the challenge and strove to remain personally involved in 
crafting the defense budget.  As one of his first acts in office, he directed Harold Brown and 
Bert Lance, Director of the Office of the Management of the Budget (OMB), to work 
together to make the five to seven billion dollars in cuts.  Carter instructed them to “eliminate 
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those programs that contribute only marginally to United States and allied security” and to 
“defer programs where doubt exists about the value they add to combat effectiveness.”126 
After three days of virtual “round the clock negotiation,” Brown and Lance, working with 
input from the military, settled on only three billion dollars in cuts.127 Both men met with 
President Carter on January 27, 1977 and explained their proposal for the cuts.  Unsatisfied, 
Carter deferred a decision on the matter and requested a briefing with more information.128 
The president demonstrated the level to which he personally planned to be involved in the 
defense budget process at the briefing held at 4 p.m. on January 31, 1977.  All of the top 
civilian defense advisors in the administration attended, as well as General Brown 
representing the JCS.  Richard Stubbing, a defense budget analyst in OMB from 1962 to 
1981, helped to prepare the briefing and recalled its content and the course of the meeting.  
Staff members at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and OMB had worked to 
compile briefings on forty-five separate issues.  They felt that a series of five viewgraphs 
representing the “major areas” should be sufficient for the president’s briefing, but they also 
made a viewgraph for each of the forty-five issues on the assumption that the president 
“might wish to explore one or more selected issues in greater depth.”  What transpired at the 
meeting surprised Stubbing.  One by one President Carter plodded through each of the forty-
five issues in detail, seeking input at various times from those present.  Russell Murray, the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Programming Analysis and Evaluation, recalled that 
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Carter had examined a single helicopter program for almost an hour.  The seven-hour 
meeting adjourned at 11 p.m. with the president indicating that he would make a decision 
later.129 At least with regard to the defense budget, Assistant Director of OMB James 
McIntyre could be accused of an understatement when he said, “it’s accurate to say that for 
the first year Carter immersed himself in budgetary details.”130 
Carter did finally approve the majority of the OSD/OMB budget proposal, and Harold 
Brown presented it to the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 24, 1977.  The new 
defense budget totaled $120.3 billion, a reduction of about $3 billion from the Ford proposal.  
Yet, the reworking of the budget significantly affected all the military services.  The Army 
lost funding for the non-nuclear Lance missile, the Apache helicopter, and the Bradley 
fighting vehicle; the Navy had a prized “nuclear strike cruiser” cut along with a submarine, 
two frigates, and additional A-7E aircraft; the Air Force faced reduced procurement of B-1s 
and F-15s and lost a new cargo plane; and the Marines lost the CH-53E helicopter.  In 
addition, the major new nuclear missile, the MX, was cut from “full scale development” to an 
earlier phase known as “advanced development” that would delay it for at least a year.131 
Publicly, the military acquiesced and supported these changes to the budget.  General 
Brown, in testimony on the new budget, stated that, “It will come as no surprise to the 
Chairman or other members of the committee that the judgment went against me,” but that 
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the new budget would “provide adequately for the immediate security needs of our 
country.”132 In its official statement on the budget, the Department of the Air Force 
confirmed its involvement in “every iteration” of the budget process and alluded to no 
“significant disagreements” during the process.  Admiral James Holloway III, the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO), testified that despite the changes in the FY78 budget the new 
submission had a “very fine balance between fleet readiness and force modernization” and 
would allow the Navy to maintain a “margin of superiority over the Soviet maritime 
forces.”133 Subsequent testimony revealed that, although “systems analysis people in DoD” 
proposed most of the cuts, the military had ample opportunity to take part in the budget 
debates.  Each of the services accepted several of the original proposed cuts and, in all cases 
where the services appealed the cuts, the civilians accepted their appeals in whole or in 
part.134 Even usually vitriolic military-affiliated special interest groups expressed little 
opposition to Carter’s 1978 budget and declared that it was “understandable” that the new 
administration “barely four weeks in office” would “feel responsible for at least addressing 
some of the campaign promises they made.”135 The level of cuts that Carter had proposed, 
and even the systems that he proposed to eliminate or delay, did not generate significant 
controversy or dissention in 1977.  Many high ranking Pentagon officers seemed willing to 
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work with the new administration, perhaps hoping for a change after several months of 
experience in office. 
 Clearly, however, the administration’s modifications to the FY78 defense budget were 
indicative of a fundamentally different policy of defense spending.  Carter had shifted 
defense procurement away from quickly acquiring new high-cost, high-technology systems 
to sustaining older, less costly alternatives.  The budget, in taking away from new systems, 
had added over $600 million to deferred maintenance and modification programs for older 
equipment.136 This change in defense procurement priorities demonstrated an assertion of 
civilian authority that went against the desires of the military.  Generally speaking, the 
Department of Defense recognized three competing priorities in the defense budget:  force 
structure (number of units, people, organization, and equipment), modernization (upgrading 
of equipment), and readiness (the ability of forces to go into immediate battle, such as 
training people and maintaining existing equipment).  The military had traditionally viewed 
force structure as the most important of the three, followed by modernization, with readiness 
least important.  Military thinking espoused the view that if they could get enough people and 
weapons, then they would receive more money for modernization, and they could put off 
readiness until a crisis would force a rapid preparation for combat.  Carter, backed fully by 
Harold Brown, sought to economize defense spending and reverse these priorities, placing 
readiness of existing forces first.137 
Thus, despite their public statements in support of the budget, the military hesitated to 
accept the changes in procurement proposed by the new administration—and so did 
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Congress.  Senator Howard Cannon (D-NV) of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
admitted that he had received a call from a General James Hollingsworth in Europe who was 
“very much concerned” with the cancellation of the non-nuclear Lance missile and thought 
the system “very, very worthwhile.”138 Admiral H.G. Rickover, Carter’s service mentor and 
the pioneer of nuclear propulsion, put strong, behind-the-scenes pressure on Congress to 
increase shipbuilding and procure additional A-7E aircraft for the Navy.139 Air Force 
officials from the Pentagon in charge of the B-1 bomber project met with contractors from 
Rockwell Corporation at a Maryland hunting lodge.  Subsequently, Rockwell President 
Robert Anderson provided stationary, stamps, and envelopes to all of the firm’s 119,000 
employees and urged them to write their congressmen in support of the B-1.140 Although 
publicly supportive of the budget, the military clearly had leverage and influence to lobby 
quietly for important programs, and many congressmen and senators proved more than 
willing to help in this effort. 
 The military lobbying and congressional desire to assert control of priorities in defense 
spending resulted in a completely revised FY78 budget.  Although Congress retained the 
monetary value of the cuts as proposed by Carter, they prioritized the spending back in line 
with military preferences for procurement of more advanced systems.  Congress restored the 
Army’s Lance missile and the Bradley fighting vehicle, the Air Force’s additional F-15 
fighters and new cargo aircraft, and the Navy’s A-7 aircraft as well as some additional 
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shipbuilding.141 New to office, the administration did not challenge Congress’ redrafting of 
the defense budget; however, according to Harold Brown, the process of the FY78 budget 
“set the tone” for the rest of the administration’s defense budgets and “it was a fight all the 
way after that on specific programs and on totals.”142 
The White House vs. the Pentagon and Congress:  Crafting the FY79 Defense Budget 
 The Carter administration kept to its course during the creation of the FY79 budget which, 
as part of the administration’s changes in DoD planning, began almost immediately after the 
approval of the FY78 budget.  In building up the FY79 defense budget, Carter remained 
personally involved from the start.  He also increasingly involved the staff of the White 
House, the NSC, and the OMB in the process and attempted to enforce strict “zero-based 
budgeting” in building his administration’s first complete defense budget. 143 
The early involvement by the president in the 1979 defense budget process created tense 
relations with the Pentagon.  It was now clear that Carter was not just attending defense 
budget meetings to become better informed about the process.  The president spent over 
eighty hours examining the details of the FY79 defense budget.  According to his special 
assistant Hamilton Jordan, he arrived well prepared for every meeting so that “the Joint 
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Chiefs couldn’t go in there and bedazzle him with either budget figures or technical talk.”144 
Some officers in the Pentagon questioned whether it was “necessary or desirable for the 
president to get so deeply involved with the intricacies of defense planning.”145 When 
explaining the administration’s new five-year defense budget planning process to the House 
Budget Committee, Defense Comptroller Fred Wacker called Carter’s early involvement in 
the process “disruptive” but defended it as being “a step in improving the link between 
planning and budgeting.”  Budget Committee Chairman Robert Leggett (D-CA) demurred, 
warning that, “every place you turn in the Pentagon you are either going to run into a mutiny 
in the ranks or perhaps a mutiny in the Congress.”146 Leggett’s prediction, while overstated, 
was in some ways prophetic. 
 Beyond his personal involvement, the president also increased the role of the White House 
staff in the defense budget process, creating additional civil-military tension.  In the White 
House, the “change in atmosphere was striking” when Carter’s staff arrived, noted William 
Jorden, a veteran White House staffer and later ambassador to Panama.  “Suits were replaced 
with slacks and sweaters . . . haircuts were two or three inches longer . . .” and “it appeared 
the average age of the White House staff had dropped about twenty years.”147 One of 
Carter’s senior advisors resigned after investigative reporters revealed he had used cocaine 
and marijuana.  Hamilton Jordan, Carter’s special assistant and later chief of staff, was also 
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accused of drug use and lewd behavior.148 Many senior military officers in the Pentagon 
questioned if the members of Carter’s White House staff had “the competence to get deeply 
involved in military issues.”149 
The administration’s changes to the defense budget process soon drew the ire of Congress 
and resulted in a military-congressional alliance against White House control of the budget.  
Fueled by the leak of an unclassified paper from the Defense Department ordered to be 
“tightly held in Pentagon circles,” four members of the House Armed Services Committee, 
led by Congressmen Robert Sykes (D-FL) and Robert Wilson (D-CA), wrote a letter to 
Secretary Brown requesting a full explanation of the new process.  The congressmen 
indicated that the proposed changes “spell out a move toward an ever tighter control of 
budgeting processes by a civilian ‘general staff’” and that the proposed changes “would 
exclude the recommendations of military personnel until the budget is in sufficiently final 
form to preclude corrections.”  The congressmen stated that they were “gravely concerned” 
with the development and that they had “discussed the matter informally with various 
members of the military community who also are gravely concerned.”  They also stated their 
fears that too many military witnesses appearing before Congress were “in the position of 
either supporting the programs approved by the Secretary of Defense or being replaced.”  
They concluded with their intention to “explore measures which will ensure that witnesses 
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can testify in complete candor” because this “unfortunately, is not now the case.”150 The 
Congress was now becoming allied with the military in opposing Carter and his staff’s 
attempts to impose greater civilian control on the defense budget process. 
 A military-congressional alliance was not the only opposition to Carter and his staff’s 
involvement with the defense budget.  By early 1978, the civilians and military in the 
Pentagon adapted and worked with each other to oppose White House intrusion.  Harold 
Brown’s efforts as a mediator paid off, and the Joint Chiefs largely accepted him as a 
reasonable and effective leader. Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and later Chairman of the 
JCS, General David Jones indicated, “We (the JCS) welcomed the assignment of Harold 
Brown as Secretary of Defense” and added that the JCS was able to have deep “substantive 
discussions with Harold Brown and understanding of our concerns, and greater 
accommodation on his part.”151 Pentagon correspondent Bernard Weinraub described 
Brown’s relations with the JCS as “straightforward and surprisingly friendly” and that “on 
important issues . . . the Joint Chiefs have, so far, fallen into line under Brown.”152 It 
appeared that what the press was calling the “Browning” of the Pentagon was working out 
well for the civil-military relationship inside the building. 
 The quality of many of Harold Brown’s civilian subordinates facilitated civil-military 
cooperation in the Pentagon.  Brown’s special assistant, John Kester, gained a reputation with 
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military officers as a “player.”  According to Kester’s executive assistant, then Colonel Colin 
Powell, Kester employed a “hard-nosed style,” and those who worked with him respected his 
direct approach and his candor.153 Brown’s Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Duncan, 
the former President of Coca-Cola, was highly regarded and “had a particular gift for 
handling defense contractors and politicking on the Hill.”154 A technical consultant to the 
Pentagon since 1966, William Perry assumed the role of Under-Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering.  Perry proved a remarkably adept manager and succeeded in 
keeping many advanced weapon systems, especially for the Army, in the defense budget.155 
Also part of the respected Brown team was David O. “Doc” Cooke, the deputy assistant 
secretary of defense for administration—known in some circles as the “Godfather of the 
Pentagon.”  A former Navy Captain, Cooke was also a Washington lawyer who understood 
how to make things happen in the sprawling Pentagon bureaucracy and had already served in 
his position since 1971.  He would go on to become a thirty-year veteran of the Pentagon, 
serving through four presidential administrations as one of the most respected civil-servants 
in the government.  Colin Powell may not have been exaggerating when he declared that, 
“Without Doc Cooke, the Pentagon would not open in the morning.”156 These experienced, 
savvy bureaucrats provided a stark contrast to Carter’s White House staff and assisted Harold 
Brown in forging a strong civil-military relationship in the Defense Department. 
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 The relationships between the Service Secretaries, the military chiefs, and Harold Brown 
varied and were not always conducive to civil-military cooperation.  General Jones, for 
example, described his relationship with Secretary of the Air Force John Stetson as a 
“delightful arrangement,” yet Stetson “absolutely could not get along with Harold Brown” 
and resigned his post rather quickly.  Stetson’s replacement, Hans Mark, indicated that he 
“didn’t mix very well” with Jones, yet General Lew Allen, who replaced Jones in 1978, said 
he had “close and friendly relations” with Mark.157 General Bernard Rogers, the Chief of 
Staff of the Army, had “very tense relations” with Clifford Alexander, the Secretary of the 
Army, and even contemplated resignation.158 Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor’s 
outspoken leadership gained the respect of superiors and subordinates alike, later earning him 
elevation to Deputy Secretary of Defense.159 Harold Brown and special assistant Kester 
attempted to circumvent the often-embattled Army and Air Force Secretaries and dealt 
directly with military members of their staffs.160 One Pentagon reorganization study 
commissioned by Brown even considered recommending the abolishment of the Service 
 
157 For Jones’ quote see David Jones, interview by Maurice Maryanow and Richard H. Kohn, transcript, 
K239.0512-1664, IRIS# 01105219, USAF Oral History Collection, AFHRA, 223.  For Hans Mark’s quote see 
Hans Mark, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Richard Landa, 4 August 1999, OSD Oral History, 31.  For Gen. 
Allen’s quotes see Lew Allen, interview by James Hasdorf, transcript, K239.0512-1694, IRIS# 01105260, 
USAF Oral History Collection, AFHRA, 184-185. 
 
158 John Kester, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, 15 April 1998, OSD Oral History, 2. 
 
159 Both Brown and his deputy, Charles Duncan, confirmed that Claytor was the strongest service secretary.  
See Charles Duncan, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, 17 May 1996, OSD Oral History, 31.  
Likewise, the Marine Commandant had high praise for Claytor—see Louis H. Wilson, Jr., interview by Edwin 
H. Simmons, History and Museums Division Oral History Transcript, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 
Washington, D.C., 1988, 223. 
 
160 John Kester indicated that “Although Harold and I both were always mouthing the mantra that we did not 
want to go around the service civilians and deal directly with the staff . . . we found ourselves doing it 
frequently.”  He also confirmed, “somewhat as with the Army, we went around the civilians in the Air Force.”  
See John Kester, interview with Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, 15 April 1998, OSD Oral History, 2-3. 
 
50 
Secretaries with their positions being taken over by the uniformed chiefs.161 In the end, 
however, Brown did not take such drastic action, but instead chose to rely more heavily on 
his under- and assistant- secretaries to conduct day to day business with the Army and Air 
Force and thus maximize civil-military cooperation. 
 Perhaps as in any work environment, the Pentagon civilians and military had some good 
and some troubled relationships.  Yet, the FY79 budget process demonstrated a trend toward 
more united civil-military opposition in the Pentagon to White House involvement in the 
budgetary process.  Analysis of three major areas demonstrates this trend toward civil-
military cooperation in the Pentagon and conflict with the White House:  the imposition of 
zero based budgeting (ZBB), the “turf battles” between OMB and OSD over the budget, and 
Pentagon attitudes toward the Carter White House. 
 Although Carter demanded that all government agencies institute ZBB, the Department of 
Defense resisted with particular vehemence.  One reason was that the Pentagon already 
employed the “cumbersome” Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) that, “in 
effect, did everything for us that ZBB would do” according to “Doc” Cooke, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Administration.162 OMB director James McIntyre acknowledged 
that the Pentagon was already “one of the most organized submitters of the budget.”163 In 
short, explained Cooke, “we did not need the discipline or extra work of ZBB.”164 
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 For the Pentagon, Carter’s attempt to impose ZBB proved to be “the ultimate in micro-
management.”165 Carter himself acknowledged that Harold Brown and the Pentagon resisted 
ZBB “vociferously” but that he still insisted upon forcing them to use the system.166 Brown 
acknowledged his resistance, saying, “I thought it was not a great idea.  You can’t keep 
pulling up the plant to look at the roots every year,” while Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Russell Murray urged Brown to tell “the President and OMB” to “consider special 
considerations and arrangements from the standard ZBB procedures for DoD.”167 In the end, 
the civilians in the Pentagon largely ignored the policy.  Hearings which were convened to 
discuss alternative DoD budgets criticized that, “the Defense Department is not really 
conforming to the mandate of the president to carry out ZBB,” and lamented, “it is time that 
we did some real ZBB on our national strategies.”168 United Pentagon resistance to ZBB had 
carried the day. 
 The wrangling between OMB and OSD over the defense budget created further conflict 
between the White House and Pentagon.  OMB Director Bert Lance viewed the Pentagon as 
fiscally irresponsible.  He urged Carter to become personally more involved in the defense 
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budget in 1979, something that the Pentagon dreaded after the “fiasco” of the 1978 budget.169 
Secretary Claytor criticized Lance and his organization, saying that “the staff at OMB 
considers themselves the super-secretaries of defense and they’d like to make all decisions 
internal and external on defense.”170 Russell Murray warned that, in the Pentagon, “the 
whole building seemed to be united” in its concern about too much outside interference in the 
defense budget, and that “the problem is not in this building but with OMB.”171 Clearly, key 
leaders in the Pentagon objected to what they deemed over-involvement by an outside 
agency in their area of expertise. 
 The conflict between OMB and the Pentagon worsened during the FY79 defense budget 
debate when Carter placed his support behind the “defense specialists” in OMB.  One such 
specialist was Randy Jayne, a former Air Force pilot characterized by New York Times 
Pentagon correspondent Bernard Weinraub as “typical of a group of little-known officials, 
often relatively young, who have moved into influential policy-making positions” in the 
administration.  Twelve years earlier, Harold Brown, who had already served eight years in 
the Pentagon, had handed Jayne his diploma as he graduated from the Air Force Academy.  
Now the tables seemed to be turned, with youth trumping experience. When Jayne and 
Brown pitched their final figures for the budget—Brown requesting $130 billion and Jayne 
arguing for $126 billion—Carter sided with Jayne and proposed a $126 billion budget for 
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FY79.172 Carter had solidly placed his support with OMB over the Pentagon during the final 
stages of the FY79 defense budget.   
 The attitude inside the Pentagon about Carter and his White House staff provided a final 
source of the conflict between the two.  The youth and seeming inexperience of Carter’s 
staff, combined with the adverse media attention focused upon them, had continued not only 
to color the perceptions of military officers, but also Carter’s own Pentagon civilian 
appointees.  John Kester likened the Carter White House to a “Where’s Waldo?” book, 
saying that it was “just a big muddle” with “people stumbling all over each other” and that 
“most of them didn’t really know much about the Pentagon except that it was sort of big and 
evil.”173 “Doc” Cooke classified the Pentagon’s relationship with Carter’s National Security 
Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, as “complicated” because Brzezinski spent too much time 
building up his own influence with the president and “trying to out Kissinger-Kissinger.”174 
Major-General John Singlaub, whom Carter had fired as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in 
Korea when he spoke out against the administration’s troop withdrawal policy, compared the 
president’s advisors to “summer interns.”175 General David Jones, the Air Force Chief of 
Staff whom Carter would later appoint Chairman of the JCS and certainly one of the most 
cooperative leaders in the military, also saw Carter’s closest staff in a negative light, stating 
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that they failed to understand how to operate in Washington.176 Clearly the Pentagon seemed 
united in its disdain for the Carter White House. 
 Several senior military and defense officials were not only contemptuous of the White 
House staff but also of Jimmy Carter himself.  While the president was proud of his prior 
military service in the Navy and felt that it gave him credibility when dealing with military 
officers, others did not agree.  Harold Brown, for instance, thought that the president 
“overestimated the waste in the military compared to that in all other departments of the 
government” because of his prior service.177 General Singlaub commented that Carter’s 
“claim” to have been a “nuclear engineer” for the Navy “rankled many senior Navy officers” 
and scoffed at the president’s assertion that rising to lieutenant commander in the Navy had 
prepared him to make “difficult decisions.”178 John Kester had a particularly hostile view of 
Carter.  He claimed that there was “something wrong” with the way Carter ended his service 
in the Navy, felt that the president “really, deep down, did not like the military,” and even 
believed that Carter “took a certain perverse enjoyment in having four-star people call him sir 
and that sort of stuff.”179 At least one member of the JCS noted this “anti-military” sentiment 
in a more subtle light:  Marine Corps Commandant General Louis Wilson went out of his 
way in his oral history to state that the President and Mrs. Carter had “discontinued” the 
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practice of inviting a member of the JCS to the White House for state dinners and that he felt 
it was a “downgrading of the Chiefs.”180 In the opinion of historian Charles Stevenson, 
additional dinner invitations may not have mattered; in his view, “Jimmy Carter provoked 
anger and hostility among many senior officers by his style and policies” and his sometimes 
“condescending and sanctimonious” demeanor toward subordinates created gulfs “so 
profound that no social amenities could bridge them.”181 
Although a negative perception of Carter may have prevailed, both military and civilians 
in the Pentagon came to recognize and appreciate Harold Brown’s quiet, reasonable 
demeanor.  They respected his behind-the-scenes battle with Carter and his advisors over the 
defense budget.  General Wilson, despite his criticism of the president, stated that he had 
“nothing but high praise for Harold Brown.”182 General Jones acknowledged that he and the 
other members of the JCS knew Brown had “fought hard” for higher defense budgets and 
more programs but had done so “in a loyal way to a great extent in the Oval Office.”183 
Kester agreed, categorizing Brown as “total loyalty in that regard,” but adding that “Harold 
would take the heat for Carter but I don’t think that Carter ever appreciated it.”  In the end, 
Kester felt certain that “the budgets were bigger than they would have been had Harold not 
been there.”184 Russell Murray made an even more profound statement:  “Harold pretty 
much saved the defense budget.  I think that everything we got in the defense budget was due 
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to Harold’s efforts.”185 Likewise, Harold Brown returned the favor, indicating that General 
George Brown had always given him frank advice and was “very supportive, very 
helpful.”186 It seemed clear that military disdain for the administration did not always extend 
to the civilians in the Pentagon, and that the civilians in the Pentagon were increasingly 
cooperating with the military to oppose White House plans. 
 At the same time that civil-military relations between the White House and Pentagon 
became more strained, the administration’s relationship with Congress also soured.  Events 
outside the realm of defense, such as Carter’s unpopular stand on the Panama Canal and 
energy conservation, cost him in his relationship even with his own party in 1977.  Political 
scientist and retired Air Force Colonel Sam Sarkesian, in his 1979 study of the first two years 
of Carter’s Administration, stated that “even Jimmy Carter’s most sympathetic supporters” 
concluded “that there was something wrong in the national security area” and the political 
consensus “seemed to be that the national security policies lacked initiative, were primarily 
reactive, and reflected the administration’s inability to ascertain a clear focus and 
purpose.”187 Carter’s congressional liaison, Frank Moore, proved ineffective and House 
Majority Leader Tip O’Neill (D-MA) told him to “stay the hell out of my office.”188 As a 
result, Brzezinski added Madeline Albright to his National Security Council Staff in 1978 as 
a special congressional liaison for defense matters.  She confirmed the poor relations with 
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Congress, stating that Carter “didn’t do a lot of the oiling and stroking activity” that was 
required in the presidential-congressional relationship.189 Likewise, Carter’s special assistant 
Hamilton Jordan could not think of a single popular initiative supported or proposed by 
Carter in his first year: “Everything was a political loser.”190 
The combined effects of the contested FY79 budget process, the military “end runs” to 
Congress, the increasing civil-military cooperation in the Pentagon, the tension between the 
Pentagon and the White House, and Carter’s unfavorable standing with Congress weakened 
the administration’s ability to assert its own prerogatives for defense spending.  The military 
recognized the opportunity offered by the confluence of these events and, as a result, 
increased its lobbying by aggressively courting recently retired officers to speak out publicly 
against Carter’s policies.  The Navy which possessed one the best organized Congressional 
Liaison office of the services and which was further strengthened by the good relationship 
between Secretary Claytor and the CNO, mounted a particularly effective lobbying effort.191 
As the FY79 budget neared completion, the Navy especially, but the other services as well, 
saw what was coming and reverted to their well honed practice—the “end run.” 
Showdown on the Beltway:  Carter’s FY79 Defense Budget Faces the Military-
Congressional Alliance 
 
President Carter submitted the $126 billion proposal to Congress with the message that it 
was “prudent and tight” and “consistent with campaign pledges” since it was $8 billion 
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below the Ford projection.192 The Navy felt the stinginess of the new budget in particular, 
suffering the loss of a nuclear-powered supercarrier and a reduction in overall shipbuilding 
by twenty percent.193 The Pentagon did not wait long after the submission of the new budget 
to leak its views to the press.  A high-ranking naval officer lamented that the new budget 
would put “the Navy in a Coast Guard status.” Another “Pentagon insider” likened Carter to 
George McGovern, who had run against Richard Nixon in 1972 as a boldly anti-war and anti-
military Democratic nominee.194 Discontent spread within the walls of the Pentagon, and 
several correspondents wrote about strong objections to Carter’s budget.  An anonymous 
“senior military official in the Pentagon” indicated “that there’s significant concern about 
meeting our readiness and force level requirements.”195 The military effort to reduce Carter’s 
control and increase the defense budget had begun. 
 As Congress reviewed the budget a number of recently retired and active duty military 
officers stepped up their lobbying effort.  Recently retired General Richard Stillwell and 
retired JCS chairman Admiral Thomas Moorer both weighed in against the plans to increase 
civilian control over the budget process and likened Harold Brown to Robert McNamara in 
letters to Congressmen.196 Two other generals contacted House Budget Chairman Robert 
Leggett (D-CA) and told him, with perhaps too much alarm to be convincing, that the 
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defense budget should be “fifty times” higher.197 The Navy League, one of the oldest and 
most effective military special interest groups, published a statement to members of Congress 
stating they were alarmed with the “downward spiral of U.S. naval strength.”198 Admiral 
Rickover again applied his back-channel pressure on Congress to overturn Carter’s 
shipbuilding cuts and restore the nuclear-powered supercarrier.  As the House Armed 
Services Committee blasted Harold Brown and added the carrier back into the budget, 
Congressman Tom Downey (D-NY) conceded that “Rickover’s got a stranglehold on the 
committee.”199 In contrast to the FY78 budget, the military’s lobbying effort appeared overt.  
It was also extremely effective and seized upon by many members in Congress who wanted 
to challenge Carter’s national defense policy. 
 While retired and active duty military utilized the “end run” to Congress to resist Carter’s 
plans, the Secretary of the Navy took a more direct stand in opposition to official policy.  In a 
private meeting with the president, Graham Claytor told Carter to his face that he could not 
support the reduced shipbuilding plan and would work with his contacts in Congress to 
increase it.  President Carter reputedly only smiled in response.200 This was not the first time 
that a Secretary of the Navy had openly opposed the President.  In 1947, James Forrestal “did 
all that he could to obstruct” the plan for military unification that President Truman had 
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submitted to Congress.  Truman did not feel that he could fire Forrestal without creating a 
civil-military crisis because the Secretary represented the views of all high-ranking Navy 
officers.  Instead, Truman sought to compromise his own position and co-opt Forrestal.201 
This approach worked and may provide insight into why Carter acted as he did, for as 
previous comments from Harold Brown and John Kester indicated, Claytor was by far the 
most popular and respected Service Secretary.  It may also help explain why Carter actually 
promoted Claytor to Deputy Secretary of Defense later.  What remained certain was that the 
military-civilian alliance in the Pentagon had strengthened throughout the 1979 budget 
process to the point that the senior Service Secretary felt capable of openly challenging the 
commander-in-chief. 
 Not only did the military and civilians in the Pentagon make statements to the press, 
conduct a behind-the-scenes lobbying effort, and privately inform Carter that they opposed 
his plans, but their FY79 congressional testimony conveyed considerably less support than in 
FY78.  Both Harold Brown and General George Brown categorized the FY79 defense budget 
as “austere, but adequate”—hardly staunch support from the two ranking defense officials in 
the administration.  Both additionally warned of no “cut insurance” in the submitted budget, 
and “if reductions are made, it will cut into muscle—not fat or padding” and any cuts at all 
“could very well erode the very slim margin of superiority that we have over the Soviet 
threat.”202 Army Chief of Staff General Bernard Rogers stated that he wanted the Bradley 
 
201 Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, 144-145.  From the perspective of political scientist Samuel 
Huntington, there are few outright firings of high level Pentagon personnel because at the highest levels of 
government relationships tend to be more “collegial.”  The collegial nature of these relationships increases as 
one moves up in the hierarchy because of the risk of adverse publicity from firings and the difficulty in finding 
qualified replacements.  See Huntington, The Common Defense, 148. 
 
202 For “cut insurance” and lack of padding see United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Budget. Task 
Force on National Security and International Affairs., FY79 Defense Budget Overview, 316-317 and 336.  For 
statement about very slim margin over Soviet threat see United States. Congress. House. Committee on 
61 
fighting vehicle retained and felt that the current budget had “major shortfalls” in the realm 
of Reserve readiness.  Contrary to Admiral Holloway’s FY78 testimony about a “balance” in 
the Navy budget, in FY79 Holloway testified that it was “adequate only to maintain the very 
slim margin of superiority” over the Soviets and stated that the nuclear-powered supercarrier 
should be built.203 The Service Secretaries provided similarly reserved support for the 
budget.  Secretary Claytor told Congressman Les Aspin (D-WI) that he was “concerned 
about the future” because the Navy “could very well be in trouble.” Secretary Stetson’s 
statement expressed qualified support for the budget and admitted that the Air Force saw 
“potential problems ahead.”204 Seemingly the only support for the administration came from 
General Jones, who although “disappointed,” supported Carter’s cancellation of the B-1 
bomber despite rigorous questioning by congressmen, one of whom called Jones a “defeatist” 
for not lobbying behind Carter’s back to continue the program.205 Jones himself confirmed 
the pressure and admitted later that he was “asked by some members of Congress to help 
end-run the President” but refused to do so.206 Compared to FY78, it seemed that the 
military had waited for Carter to change his policies and when he did not, in FY79 the 
dissention became openly public. 
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 While the congressional testimony illustrated the civil-military cooperation in the 
Pentagon and the tension between the Pentagon and the White House, the reaction by 
Congress showed the strength of the military-congressional alliance.  Senator Tower (R-TX) 
again assailed Harold Brown, indicating that the “compelling arguments and 
recommendations of our uniformed military leaders” were being given scant attention.207 
Congressman Robert Leggett (D-CA), traditionally sympathetic to economizing defense 
spending, classified the FY79 budget a “controversial one” and felt that significant cuts could 
result in voters “erupting in response.”208 Ultimately, Congress reworked the budget again 
and approved more high-technology items, including the Navy’s fifth nuclear carrier costing 
two billion dollars.209 Congress, in the same manner as with the FY78 budget, had brought 
the FY79 defense budget more in line with military prerogatives and this time had been 
brash, openly questioning the administration’s policies. 
 Carter blustered at having his first complete defense budget submission re-prioritized by 
Congress.  He took the “daring” and “extraordinary step” of vetoing the defense 
appropriations bill.  Indeed, such a defense authorization bill had never before been 
vetoed.210 The press characterized the move as Carter’s “most serious challenge to Congress 
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in sixteen months in office.”211 Carter’s veto message set straight his priorities for defense 
spending, stating that “we need more immediate improvements in our defense forces.  The 
Navy does not need a fifth nuclear-powered aircraft carrier,” and the expenditure for such a 
ship would force cuts in Army and Air Force equipment maintenance and research and 
development.212 Carter’s veto message made it clear that he resented the congressional 
alterations of his plan for defense spending and declared that he, as the commander-in-chief, 
would be the one to determine how defense dollars should be spent. 
 The veto message provoked an immediate and harsh backlash from Congress. Even 
congressmen who had voted against the nuclear carrier went on the record saying that “it was 
a poor reason to veto a defense bill” while another deemed Carter’s action “irresponsible.”  
Congressman Melvin Price (D-IL), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, sent 
a scathing letter to President Carter criticizing the veto.  Price lectured the President on the 
process of defense authorization and appropriation, refuting the assertions in the veto 
message line by line, and explaining how appropriating and authorizing a two billion dollar 
nuclear carrier did not equate to cutting funds from other areas of the defense budget.  
Having made his point, Price chastised, “I can only conclude, Mr. President, that you have 
been ill-advised on the process of Congressional authorization and appropriation.”213 He 
went on to blast the tone of the veto message and met Carter’s challenge to Congress: 
 The burden of your message is that Congress does not have a place in 
defense policy-making except to ‘rubber stamp’ recommendations of the 
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Executive Branch.  I reject that philosophy.  I believe Congress deserves to   
be treated as a partner in defense decision-making, not as a poor relation.214 
Price then went on to assail Carter’s past record on defense, referencing a letter he had 
written a year earlier concerning the cancellation of the B-1 and the slowdown of the MX 
missile program: 
 At that time, I expressed hope that the Congress could work with the 
Administration to provide necessary defense systems.  Since that time, we 
have had the cancellation of production for the enhanced radiation weapon, 
the indecision in response to the demonstrated need to protect the vulner-
ability of our land-based ICBMs, the proposed withdrawal of our forces from 
Korea, and now the veto of a Defense authorization bill and a determined 
effort to stop another large aircraft carrier.  I am deeply concerned as to the 
cumulative effect of all these actions on our defense capability and equally 
concerned as to their effect on the perception of potential adversaries as to  
our willingness to meet our national security commitments.215 
He further noted opposition to Carter’s veto in the Senate, including resistance from Senator 
Gary Hart (D-CO), who “despite being one of the most vigorous spokesmen in Congress for 
going to smaller carriers,” had called on his colleagues to override the veto.  Price then 
closed with a promise that he would ask the House of Representative to override Carter’s 
veto in one week.  Congress had clearly responded to Carter’s challenge and offered 
conclusive evidence that several influential members disagreed with his defense budget 
priorities. 
 Carter, having fully committed himself and his administration, waged a pitched political 
battle to prevent the veto from being overturned.  Vice President Walter Mondale held daily 
meetings to coordinate the effort.  The DoD provided information to Mondale’s staff, 
suggesting that they emphasize that “money would be taken from urgent time-critical needs 
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for a purpose that is not time-critical” and recommending that Carter promise a 
conventionally-powered carrier in the FY80 budget.216 Harold Brown, who was reported to 
have “mixed feelings” about the veto in the first place, was forced to become one of the 
public spokesmen selling it and at the same time conducted a behind-the-scenes lobbying 
effort with influential Senators.217 The White House Office of Media Liaison mounted an 
extensive public relations campaign, disseminating “talking points” to all members of the 
staff while emphasizing that Carter had not taken the decision to veto “lightly” and that “the 
key behind the President’s veto is the fact that the Act reverses our national defense priorities 
by de-emphasizing immediate strength and readiness.”218 The concerted effort paid off, and 
by August 25, 1978 Carter’s staff celebrated the fact that newspaper editorials were running 
nine to one in favor of the veto.219 When Congressmen Price revealed his intent to override 
the veto in his letter of August 31, 1978 the president was unmoved.  He knew Price did not 
have the votes he needed.  Carter’s Congressional Liaison Frank Moore dismissed Price’s 
challenge, noting that “we will have a clear-cut victory” when it came to the motion to 
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override.220 Carter and his staff were correct.  The veto was not overridden.  Furthermore, in 
part by promising to request a conventionally-powered carrier of Nimitz-class size in the 
FY80 budget, the revised bill eliminated the nuclear-powered vessel.  Carter had his victory 
over Congress, but it had come at the price of hardening the military-congressional alliance 
and at the sacrifice of any hope for a future executive-legislative defense policy consensus 
during his administration. 
After the Battle: The Significance of the Veto and the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations 
 Although much of the press and subsequent historiography tended to cast the veto as being 
simply a fight over the procurement of the nuclear supercarrier, clearly much else was 
involved.221 First, the president was locked in an overall struggle with Congress at the time 
over asserting his executive authority.  Carter threatened to veto up to thirty other bills “to 
conform to the administration’s program of budget restraint.”222 Second, linking the veto 
only to the carrier and naval shipbuilding disregarded the fact that Carter’s message proposed 
a plan for defense spending that was consistent with his policy of investing in maintenance 
and readiness.  The veto of HR 10929 was in fact a final presidential assertion of authority 
over the defense budgetary process.  Finally, the adverse impact of the veto on the 
relationship between Carter and Congress in the realm of defense policy has been 
understated.  The final result of the veto was consistent with the ongoing patterns of civil-
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military cooperation in the Pentagon, the military-congressional alliance, and the military 
conflict with the White House. 
 To view Carter’s veto as a climatic battle or a decisive turning point in post-World War II 
civil-military relations would exaggerate its significance.  Nonetheless, if the budget was as 
important to civil-military relations as those involved at the time believed, it does seem to be 
a logical breaking point in examining the first half of the administration.  Although civil-
military relations continued to evolve, many changes took place that made the second half of 
Jimmy Carter’s administration different from the first. 
 First, Carter’s views on defense and foreign policy changed over time.  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Advisor, admitted that there was a “highly liberal” 
tone to the first two years of the administration, but that through his efforts and with hard-
learned experience this “bias was contained.”223 William Odom, then a colonel serving in the 
White House, concurred that the administration “sailed in one direction for two years and 
slowly came back around the other direction in the last two.”224 Overall, much of the 
secondary literature concerning the Carter Administration agrees, often emphasizing the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an important turning point.225 At least one senior Defense 
Department official agreed, alluding to the invasion as a conversion-like experience when he 
said that Carter was “reborn after Afghanistan.”226 Yet, one should not overstate the impact 
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of Afghanistan to the exclusion of other factors.  Carter had promised to increase defense 
spending long before the Soviet invasion.227 Several smaller incidents, such as the issue of a 
Soviet combat brigade being “discovered” in Cuba, the taking of American hostages in 
Tehran, and polls indicating a sharp rise in the popularity of defense spending in late 1978 
probably had more of a causal influence on Carter’s change of mind.228 Very possibly, the 
president simply began to give more weight to the advice of the JCS and Harold Brown. 
 Second, the defense budgets in FY80 and FY81 were less controversial and relatively 
larger than FY78 and FY79.  By the end of 1978, liberal members of Carter’s staff who had 
previously resisted any rise in defense spending began to support Pentagon requests for more 
money.229 Carter himself began to emphasize publicly plans to increase the defense budget 
rather than decrease it, even while making cuts in social programs.230 The president did this 
despite strong attacks from the liberal wing of his party.231 David Cooke, who felt that the 
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defense budget “bottomed out” in FY79, conceded that in the last years “of Carter’s 
administration there was an upturn which foreshadowed the flood of the Reagan years.”232 
General Lew Allen went a step further when he stated that Carter’s growth rate in defense, 
“had it been sustained,” would have been “a higher growth rate than the Reagan 
administration.”233 This assertion proves quantitatively correct because of the remarkable 
contrast between the administration’s FY78-79 and FY80-81 defense budget proposals.234 
Indeed, by 1980 the public relations emphasis of Carter’s staff was entirely on how much the 
administration had boosted military spending in its last two years.235 Regardless of the 
motivation, Pentagon correspondent George Wilson correctly assessed that by 1979, Carter 
had “chosen a far different path” than the campaign promises that he had made in 1976.236 
Third, Carter became less personally involved in the FY80 and FY81 budget processes 
than in the past.  Harold Brown later admitted that Carter’s “strong personal role in defense 
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decisions” had tapered off by the last two years of the administration.237 Consistent with 
limiting his personal involvement in the process, Carter also began increasingly to accept the 
advice of his military advisors.  The president had never shut out military advice.  He just 
seldom followed it in his first two years in office.  Carter had always provided the JCS direct 
access to him and granted them meetings whenever they wished to discuss an important 
issue.238 Both Admiral Holloway and General Wilson confirmed this, with the former 
making the claim that they did not “know of any president who has offered the chiefs of 
service greater opportunity to provide advice on military matters.”239 General Jones admitted 
that getting Carter to follow their advice “took a lot of work” and that “part of it was 
external,” but that overall the JCS’s “quiet, calm manner helped in convincing him that the 
cutback in defense ought to stop.”  As Jones put it, “I felt that during the four years our 
influence increased considerably.”240 As Carter distanced himself from the defense budget 
process, he therefore proved more willing to listen to his advisors. 
 Finally, and most importantly, Carter was able to change almost all members of the JCS, 
replacing them with officers more supportive than the first set of chiefs.  When General 
George Brown, stricken with cancer, stepped down in June 1978, Carter replaced him with 
General David Jones who had been publicly supportive of many of the president’s decisions.  
General Lew Allen, considered a “surprise appointment” and a scientific expert like Harold 
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Brown, replaced Jones as Chief of Staff of the Air Force.  He, too, proved to be supportive of 
Carter, stating that much of the military animus toward Carter was “misplaced because he 
had really changed his views a good deal.”241 When Harold Brown slated General John 
Vessey, who had spoken out publicly against Carter’s Korea withdrawal policy, to replace 
General Rogers as Army Chief, Carter stopped the move.  He instead brought in General 
Edward C. Meyer who had been scheduled to take command of the U.S. Army in Europe at 
the end of that week.242 When Admiral Holloway, the CNO who had publicly lobbied for the 
nuclear supercarrier, retired from his post, Carter denied him the traditional honorary visit.  
Carter replaced him with Admiral Thomas Hayward, who worked hard to try to suppress 
open dissent in the Navy and as a result, according to press reports, became “rocked by 
criticism” for his “capitulation.”243 Carter had clearly made some deliberate choices as to 
which generals he would place in the highest offices. 
 Despite the political pressures and civil-military tension that Carter and Harold Brown 
faced, it would be inaccurate to say that they “purged” the JCS and appointed only “yes-
men” to replace the outgoing generals.  Certainly Carter and Brown succeeded in taking 
control of the military promotion system to the consternation of the JCS.  This power of 
promotion was largely concentrated in the office of John Kester.  Yet, when interviewed for 
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the position of Kester’s military assistant, Colin Powell was impressed by the fact that “he 
was not looking for a yes-man.”244 Likewise, the same could be said for the selection 
officers of the JCS.  What Carter, Brown, and Kester sought, however, were forward-looking 
officers willing and open to change in the defense establishment.  Their pattern of selection 
and officer management supports this contention.  General Jones, selected as the new 
Chairman of the JCS, had not only supported Carter on the B-1 but, perhaps more 
importantly, described himself as a “creature of change and an advocate of change” willing 
to oversee and mediate Carter’s plans for the military.245 General Bernard Rogers, leaving 
his post as Army Chief of Staff, was appointed SACEUR despite his serious clashes with 
Kester and Clifford Alexander.  Based on the revisions in Carter’s defense policy, this move 
placed Rogers in a position where he would continue to give strong input into the defense 
budgetary and planning process, for Brown had succeeded in greatly increasing this role for 
the CINCs.246 It would be difficult to classify Rogers as being completely deferential to 
civilian authority, yet he was considered at the time a “new breed” of intellectual officer 
willing and open to change.247 Similarly, his replacement, General Meyer, was a very young 
appointee who was, like Carter, a strong advocate of readiness and had headed Carter’s 
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efforts to create the Rapid Deployment Force.248 The same pattern emerged in the selection 
of the Air Force Chief of Staff.  While Brzezinski recommended General Robert Huyser to 
Carter based on the general’s popularity and his ability to “deliver the Air Force . . . on 
important arms control issues,” the president refused.249 He instead appointed the scientist, 
General Lew Allen, who Brown had worked with before and who had done much research 
into pioneering space, missile, and “stealth” technology for the future.  Allen, considered 
“the most learned missile expert in JCS history,” would often argue toe to toe with fellow 
scientist Harold Brown—and Brown was the strongest advocate of Allen over Huyser.250 
When selecting the successor CNO, Admiral Hayward was the first Naval Aviator chosen to 
the post and considered somewhat of a “maverick.”  He was, however, considered a 
technologist, open to Carter’s “total force” concept in the Navy, and his opinion regarding 
aircraft carriers would carry considerable weight with Congress.251 Nothing indicates that 
Carter thought he would support smaller carriers.  The overall pattern, then, seemed to be one 
of Carter and Brown selecting officers willing to oversee substantial change and provide 
expert technical advice, rather than officers who were simply going to be “yes-men.”  This 
second set of Chiefs would therefore facilitate—although by no means eliminate—the 
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resistance to the efforts in the second half of the administration to assert stronger civilian 
control of defense policies and budgets. 
 Although Carter’s relations with his military chiefs improved, his relations with the 
military as a whole remained troubled.  Most members of the military still viewed Carter’s 
budgets, despite their increase over time, as a “step backward” from what Ford had 
planned.252 Indeed, Carter’s first defense budget was a net real decrease of 3.5% from the 
Ford FY77 budget.253 Many less-senior members of the military, perhaps some of those 
aides attending Carter’s first meeting at Blair House with the JCS, never altered their 
negative opinion of Carter and his administration.  According to General Lew Allen, the 
attitudes of some of these younger officers toward the civilian leadership of the Carter 
administration bordered on “unacceptable insubordination.”254 These “iron majors” 
significantly impact civil-military relations since they populate the staffs that support senior 
policy and decision makers.  Harold Brown was so conscious of the impact of these “iron 
majors” that he chose to consult members of the JCS when they were alone.  Brown 
complained that, in the official meeting room for the JCS known as “The Tank,” there was 
“always one of the ‘iron majors’ watching to make sure” that the Generals “toed the line.”255 
General Jones described these officers as “zealots” and lamented some of these officers 
“down below” always argued “that the Chief ought to resign, the country was going to hell, 
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and the President doesn’t know what he is talking about.”256 Colin Powell, serving as an 
“iron major” at the time, confirmed these sentiments, saying that, “on the whole, the 
vibrations coming out of the Carter White House were not comforting to the military 
profession.”257 Together, these factors moderated the improvement in civil-military relations 
ending with the FY79 budget process. 
Conclusion:  What the FY78/79 Defense Budgets Reveal about Civil-Military Relations 
and Why it Matters 
 
The FY78 and FY79 defense budgets ended a phase of civil-military relations in the Carter 
Administration.  Growing cooperation within the Pentagon, increasing conflict between the 
Pentagon and the White House, and a strengthening military-congressional alliance best 
characterized civil-military relations during this phase.  This pattern prevailed because of 
Carter’s personal involvement in the budget process and his desire to re-prioritize defense 
spending.  Carter had taken office during a period of great uncertainty about the future of the 
military.  Carter’s campaign promises and his initial intervention in the Department of 
Defense budget process demonstrated his far-reaching ambition to re-prioritize defense 
spending.  The military, apprehensive about the increasing civilian control and loss of their 
own prerogatives of prioritization, utilized behind-the-scenes lobbying in Congress to defeat 
many of Carter’s modifications to the FY78 budget.  As the administration continued through 
the FY79 budget process, the military and civilians in the Pentagon formed a better working 
relationship.  While civil-military cooperation in the Pentagon increased through the FY79 
budget process, friction between the more-unified Pentagon and Carter’s White House also 
increased.  Carter’s relationship with Congress continued to deteriorate through 1978, and the 
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military, along with some civilians in the Pentagon, sought an even stronger military-
congressional alliance to oppose Carter’s efforts to reshape and reduce the military 
establishment.  The veto of the FY79 defense authorization bill was the end result of these 
prevailing patterns in civil-military relations. 
 Clearly, the primary point of contention for the military was presidential involvement early 
in the budgetary process and his desire to re-prioritize defense spending, even more than the 
actual budget cuts.  While the military certainly wanted to keep all of their major programs, 
and some officers saw Carter’s ending his first meeting with the JCS with promises to cut the 
defense budget as a “parting shot,” there were also some realists in the military like General 
Jones who knew that cutting the defense budget was not unique to the Carter 
administration.258 Jones stated bluntly that “everybody cut the defense budget” at some point 
in their terms “Nixon had, Ford had, and Carter cut it even more.  We didn’t like it.”259 The 
source of conflict was larger than any one program—it lay in Carter’s effort to reshape the 
allocation of resource in the military from force structure and modernization to readiness and 
maintenance, to impose OMB-controlled zero-based budgeting on the Pentagon, and to 
involve himself personally in many minute details of defense spending. 
 Despite their controversy, the FY78 and FY79 budgets kept in development many of the 
systems that now define the modern American military.  For the Army, the M-1 tank, 
Bradley fighting vehicle, Apache helicopter, and MLRS all survived to become superb 
combat systems.  The Air Force continued with the MX ballistic missile, and even the 
“cancelled” B-1, regarded by long-time defense correspondent George Wilson as Carter’s 
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“most controversial weapons decision since taking office,” remained alive in a research and 
development phase to be resurrected by the Reagan Administration.260 Despite being 
debated for hours in Carter’s first meeting on the defense budget, the Navy and Marines CH-
53 helicopter gained continued budgetary support—only to fail miserably in the attempt to 
rescue the American hostages in Iran due to poor maintenance practices.  The Navy’s 
intensive lobbing efforts also ensured that the F/A-18 fighter and “Aegis” cruiser survived to 
enter service.  If Carter did not think the Navy needed a fifth nuclear-powered supercarrier, 
then President Reagan and Congress clearly disagreed; a fifth through tenth would be 
commissioned—with the eighth being named in honor of Senator John Stennis, who often 
supported the Navy over Carter, and the tenth being christened the USS Ronald Reagan.261 
Thus, Carter’s budgets hardly crippled long-term American military superiority. 
 Civil-military relations during Carter’s administration, probably like that of many 
administrations, evolved over time.  Carter’s first meeting with the Joint Chiefs, reported as 
cataclysmic by some, did not undermine the fundamental basis of the civil-military 
relationship in the U.S. government.  Although many of the “iron majors” never could 
overcome their disdain for Carter, and although Carter and Brown never fully gained the 
loyalty and support of his first set of Chiefs, the most experienced and professional officers 
in the military performed their duty and acceded to civilian control of the military.  In fact, in 
the end, the thirty-ninth president would find a naval vessel named in honor of him—the USS 
Jimmy Carter, a Seawolf class nuclear-powered submarine commissioned in February 
 
260 For controversy on B-1 see George Wilson, "Panel Rebuffs President on Scuttling B-1," Washington Post,
September 29, 1977, A1 and A20.  For retention and resurrection of the B-1 see Carter, Keeping Faith, 88. 
 
261 Chris Bishop, ed., The Encyclopedia of World Sea Power (New York: Crescent Books, 1988), 69. 
 
78 
2005—perhaps indicating that even the embittered Navy was willing to cede that the Carter 
years inflicted no permanent damage to the American civil-military relationship. 262 
While civil-military relations during the Carter years may in some ways be characteristic 
of the course of other administrations, certain factors make them unique and worthy of 
continued study and emphasis.  As a broader category of civil-military relations, the period 
since the end of World War II has demanded more study of how the military interacted with 
its civilian superiors.  As Louis Smith pointed out in American Democracy and Military 
Power (1951), in the age of “total war” since World War II, the civil-military relationship has 
required not only military subordination to civilian power, but also coordination with 
civilian policy.  In his words, such coordination is “imperative if the requisite power for 
sustained combat is to be maintained.”263 The stalemate in Korea and the debacle of Vietnam 
provide modern examples of failed civil-military coordination.  Some critics would argue 
that the current conflict in Iraq will yield a similar result.  Now, more than ever, the 
understanding of the civil-military relationship since World War II has a particular value in 
the context of twentieth-century military history.  For several additional reasons the Carter 
years in particular deserve attention in this scholarly examination. 
 First, extreme distrust between the president and his generals characterized the last years 
of the Nixon Administration, often cited as the nadir of American civil-military relations. 264 
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Carter’s ascendancy therefore represented an entirely new administration coming to power at 
a potentially critical juncture for the future of civil-military relations.  Just as the nation 
watched to see if Jimmy Carter would alter politics as usual in Washington, many high-
ranking military leaders and “iron majors” at the Pentagon watched to see how this Democrat 
and self-proclaimed moralist would deal with the military. 
 Second, the Carter Administration chose an unusual course in the post-Vietnam era with 
its desire to assert a strong and direct civilian control over the Department of Defense.  Not 
all administrations came into office with plans to increase civilian control of the military as a 
matter of principle and process; some commanders-in-chief and their Secretaries of Defense 
have taken a “hands-off” approach from the start.  The administrations of Nixon, Ford, and 
Reagan generally adopted such a strategy.265 Nixon’s first Secretary of Defense, Melvin 
Laird (1969-1973), consciously tried to reverse the trend of civilian involvement under 
McNamara and stated that he was “striving to decentralize decision making as much as 
possible” while “delegating to the Military Departments more responsibility to manage 
development and procurement programs.”266 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger (1973-
1975), although held in high regard by the military, was fired when the Nixon White House 
would not support larger defense budgets, but under President Ford and Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld the budget increased again with the FY77 and FY78 submissions.  Ronald 
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Reagan, never regarded as a “details president,” had this image confirmed by his first 
Chairman of the JCS, General Jones, who stated that Reagan simply did not want to get 
involved in the intricacies of the Defense Department.267 Thus, the Carter administration 
chose a unique course in the immediate post-Vietnam era with its desire to assert a strong and 
direct civilian control of the military, or at least of its budgetary and procurement process. 
 Third, even beyond budgetary issues, the Carter administration chose to increase civilian 
control in areas that had traditionally been closely guarded by the military, including 
retirement pay, officer promotions, contingency planning, and most importantly the specifics 
of the budgeting process.  While it would seem at first that the McNamara years, often cited 
as the pinnacle of civilian “involvement” in military realms, would not be comparable to the 
Pentagon under Jimmy Carter and Harold Brown, the contrast is not so straightforward.  
Harold Brown, for instance, asserted more direct control over officer promotions and 
assignments than any previous Secretary and stood in sharp contrast to James Schlesinger in 
this regard.268 Additionally, Secretary Brown, though doing so to ease civil-military tension, 
increased the authority of his assistant secretaries over the Service Secretaries, thus 
consolidating civilian control at an even higher level in the Pentagon.269 The PPBS process, 
installed by McNamara as a means to increase civilian control of the budget, was still in use 
and Carter wanted to place ZBB on top of it as an additional layer of control. 270 These 
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factors, coupled with the president’s personal involvement in the defense budgetary choices, 
led in some ways to civilian control in the Carter years rivaling that of the 1960s.  Although 
ZBB is gone, the assertion of civilian control in these previously military-dominated areas 
has proved to be Carter’s long-term legacy to the defense establishment. 
 Fourth, the Carter administration found itself to be the first Democratic administration to 
have to deal with a military officer corps becoming increasingly Republican—or, at the very 
least more open in proclaiming its conservatism.  According to one well-known survey, as 
Carter entered office in 1976, sixteen percent of all military officers characterized themselves 
as “liberal” and sixty-one percent as “conservative.”  By the end of Carter’s term in 1980, 
only four percent would classify themselves as liberal, with conservatives increasing to 
seventy-two percent.271 Likewise, the margin of preference among officers for the 
Republicans over the Democrats jumped from less than 3:1 to almost 5:1 in the same 
period.272 While many scholars have noted the unique dynamics of civil-military relations 
between the “liberal” Clinton administration and the “conservative” military under General 
Colin Powell, the Carter administration actually provided a precursor to this phenomenon.273 
Fifth, the transformation and recovery of the U.S. military after the Vietnam War, so often 
credited to Reagan’s buildup of the military, cannot be fully understood without emphasis on 
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the Carter administration.  All too often, Carter’s term has been associated with the famous 
“decade of neglect” thesis which stated that the 1970s represented a period where U.S. 
military power vis-à-vis the Soviets had declined significantly.274 While the overall idea may 
have validity, holding the Carter administration primarily responsible for the decline in 
military strength does not seem justified.  Often overlooked, for example, is the fact that 
Carter’s final two budgets foreshadowed the flood of defense spending in the Reagan years. 
 Finally, understanding civil-military relations during the Carter administration offers 
insights that administration which are not available in the current historiography and political 
science models.  The civil-military dialogue created by the 1980-1981 defense budget 
process provides one significant example of this.  Many observers have cited Carter’s 
increase in these defense budgets as primarily a concession to conservative members of the 
Senate in order to gain their support for ratification of SALT II.275 Such an analysis certainly 
has merit—Carter himself admitted his intentions in this regard.276 Closer analysis, however, 
indicates that the rise in defense budgets may also have been in large part due to the 
evolutionary course of civil-military relations throughout the administration.  Likewise, a 
more complete understanding of the civil-military relations within the Carter years can assist 
in explaining otherwise confusing outcomes that do not fit a particular political science 
model.  As one example, political scientist Ole Holsti commented that there was little 
explanation in his study for why military officers would have expressed little disdain for 
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Ronald Reagan’s stateside public relations assignment during World War II relative to 
Jimmy Carter who served with distinction in the U.S. Navy.277 As this study has shown, 
even Harold Brown’s special assistant John Kester, a civilian in the Pentagon, expressed 
doubt as to the meaningfulness of Carter’s military service and other reports indicated that 
senior admirals were “rankled” by Carter’s claims about his naval service.  Taking these 
negative perspectives into account may help explain why the military service issue was less 
of an advantage for Carter over Reagan in 1980.  Overall, these two points illustrate the value 
of further in-depth analysis of civil-military relations during the Carter administration. 
Much work remains to be done, and the study of the second half of the Carter 
administration is just as important as is the first.  This work has provided a framework to 
approach the next study and perhaps broaden the intellectual curiosity about civil-military 
relations in general while filling an important gap in the existing historiography.  The future 
security of our nation and our appreciation of history can only benefit from a better 
understanding of this critical area of interaction within our government. 
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Appendix 1 
The Annual Defense Budget Process 
 The annual defense budget process is one of the most complicated processes within the 
federal government bureaucracy.  The following discussion is a brief, broad overview of the 
process during the Carter years.  While the general pattern remains the same, each 
presidential administration adjusts the defense budget timeline somewhat to fit into its overall 
planning cycle.  The Carter administration was no different in this regard and, upon taking 
office, began to institute changes in the defense budget drafting process.  As is often the case, 
different governmental agencies and organizations fail to meet recommended budgetary 
timelines, thus altering the course of the defense budget drafting process.  The Carter 
administration was again no exception--struggling to meet timelines on its first two iterations 
of the budget as it attempted to implement its new systems.278 Significantly, the annual 
defense budget process is cyclical in nature and attention to the defense budget is constant--
so, as soon as one iteration is finished, work begins on the next. 
 According to improvements made during Robert S. McNamara's tenure as Secretary of 
Defense (1961-1968) which were known as the Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
System (PPBS), the annual defense budget process begins roughly in March of a given year.  
The process then ends in February of the next year with the finalized budget submitted to 
Congress.  Congress, in between this time, modifies the budget through a series of 
committees.  These committees are the House and Senate Budget Committees, the House and 
Senate Appropriations Committees, and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.  
These committees each have different focuses and agendas based on their composition, but 
 
278 Walter S. Poole, JCS Special Historical Study: The Evolution of the Joint Strategic Planning System, 1947-
1989 (Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Staff, 1989), 15.  Hereafter cited as Evolution of the JSPS. 
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all seek input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Service Secretaries, and the Secretary 
of Defense during open and closed testimony.  Based on their own discussions and the 
testimony before them, the various committees modify the budget and vote on it through 
Congress in a series of bills.  Generally, by the end of March, the congressional stage is 
complete and Congress votes and submits a defense authorization bill to the president for his 
signature.  The president can then either sign the bill into law or veto it. 
 During the Carter administration, the process began with the JCS submitting the Joint 
Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP).  The plan "outlined the threats which jeopardized the 
security of nation and recommended the military forces which the Chiefs believed were 
necessary to counter the threat."279 Taking into account the information in the JSOP, 
civilians in the administration then formulated guidance documents for the military.  In 1976, 
prior to Carter's first budget, these documents consisted of Defense Guidance (DG), Planning 
and Programming Guidance (PPG), and Fiscal Guidance (FG).  Carter and his Secretary of 
Defense Harold Brown felt these three documents were cumbersome, redundant, and failed 
to integrate fully foreign policy into the defense budget process.  Therefore, Brown grouped 
these three separate documents into a single one known as Consolidated Guidance (CG).280 
In the words of the JCS official historian, this was a "watershed event" which brought 
significant changes to the annual defense budget process.281 
Brown did not feel that starting the process in March for completion in February of the 
next year was adequate, so he requested the JSOP from the JCS in October and proposed 
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several modifications to the PPBS.  Following the issuing of the JSOP, the Chairman of the 
JCS would then meet with the Secretary of Defense at the start of November to “suggest key 
features of the CG.”282 By the start of January, the draft CG would be sent to the JCS for 
review.  From this document, which in theory revealed how far the administration was 
willing to go in meeting the threats detailed in the original JSOP, the JCS would develop a 
document known as the JSOP II.  This document detailed how the JCS proposed to meet the 
threats to the nation based on the limited means of the administration laid out in the draft CG.  
The JSOP II would then be returned to the Secretary of Defense with only a one week 
suspense for completion.283 
After reviewing the JCS comments for almost two weeks, Harold Brown would meet with 
the JCS in the third week of February to discuss their comments.  The Office of the Secretary 
of Defense staff would then revise the CG based upon this discussion, and the revised draft 
CG would be sent to President Carter for his signature at the end of the month.  In the first 
week of March, the president would then meet with Secretary of Defense Brown and the JCS 
to discuss the CG and make his recommendations, from which the final draft of the CG 
would be prepared by the third week in March.  Each service would then submit a 
Programming Objectives Memorandum (POM), a rough draft of how the service planned to 
meet the CG and a tentative list of its costs associated with doing so--again with only a one 
week suspense.  Through a process of meetings and negotiations, with periodic status reports 
sent to the president, the OSD and JSC would work together to determine which programs 
would receive funding.  By the start of August, each service would then meet individually 
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with the Secretary of Defense to "reclama" (appeal) any cuts which they strongly opposed.  
After decision on all of the reclamas, the individual services would then submit their budgets 
by the end of September, when they would then be compiled into the Department of Defense 
budget for approval by the president and his Office of the Management of the Budget 
staff.284 The process of the administration developing its own defense budget was then 
essentially complete. 
 These changes proposed by Secretary Brown, although resisted by the military and 
Congress, were eventually implemented with minor modifications.285 The JCS finally 
adapted by making several important changes in their own Joint Strategic Planning System 
that would make the overall process more efficient.  In the judgment of the official JCS 
historian the reforms during the Carter Administration “clearly enhanced the utility of the 
Joint Strategic Planning System.”286 Thus, in some ways, the legacy of Carter and Brown’s 
changes to the annual defense budget process carry on to the present day.   
 
284 Timeline taken from "Memorandum for Service Secretaries and the CJCS, Subject: Improvements in the 
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